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This thesis is comprised of three essays that examine the impact of economic deterioration on 
the economy and society. It focuses on the interrelations among several socio-economic ills 
examined: sovereign defaults, excessive public debt, absence of economic growth and suicides. 
In an attempt to provide a holistic view of the topics covered, a combination of both economic 
and political explanatory variables are used.  
After discussing in Chapter 1 the motivation for this thesis, the Global Financial Crisis of 2007, 
Chapter 2, investigated the determinants of sovereign defaults.  With the help of a logit 
regression and using a variety of political and economic variables, we show that both types of 
variables determine whether a county will default or not.  Various robustness tests were also 
carried out that confirm these findings. 
In Chapter 3, the effect of the IMF intervention, once a country has defaulted, on its economic 
growth is investigated. The IMF intervention is measured as a dummy and the method used is 
the two stage least squares regression, where the instruments are the level of democracy and 
the UN Security council temporary membership. The findings suggest that   the lagged effect 
of IMF rather than its contemporaneous effect is positive with respect to economic growth.  
In Chapter 4, the focus is on the sociological effects of the IMF intervention, with the dependent 
variable being suicide rates. The data sample has been split in many different ways, such as 
males/females, and the results of the research show that IMF intervention, unemployment and 
abortions increase suicides whereas   alcohol consumption decreases them. 
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This thesis attempts to examine the impact of countries’ economic hardship on various socio-
economic variables. The concept of socio-economic ills captures what this research will focus 
on: sovereign defaults, excessive debt and their interrelation with future economic growth and 
suicide rates, trying to give a holistic view of the three ills examined. The trigger for this study 
was the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) that started in 2007 and the effects of which are still 
visible until now in certain countries. There has been a great debate on why some countries 
have been hit harder by the crisis and on whether the measures taken to overcome the crisis 
were the most suitable ones. The question that arises is whether the GFC revealed other 
underlying economic problems that have been there for a while? In this thesis, we will firstly 
try to understand why sovereigns reach a stage where they cannot repay their debt and examine 
whether the determinants of defaults are only economical or both economical and political. 
Then we will investigate on what happens after such an event. We are interested in the 
implications of the country making a request for help from International Financial Institutions 
(IFIs) and more specifically the International Monetary Fund (IMF): such assistance can have 
both economic, and, more broadly, social repercussions. The question that we have asked is 
what determines whether a country will default? And when it does, what is the effect of the 
IMF intervention on its growth? And does this intervention impact only the economy or has 
other effects on the society, for example, on the rate of suicides?  
To start with, it will be useful to give a bit of background on the GFC. In 2007 the US market 
experienced a subprime mortgage crisis which spread fast to the banking sector with the final 
hit being the collapse of the investment bank Lehman Brothers on September 15th, 2008. This 
financial crisis is considered the worst crisis after the Great Depression in 1930. Unfortunately, 
this crisis was not restricted only to the US but spread all over the world becoming a global 
crisis. Both emerging and advanced markets faced great pressure in their foreign exchange and 
stock exchange markets as well as in their sovereign debt markets. Some countries experienced 
large reductions in their GDP, for example, Latvia and Romania saw their GDP decreasing by 




35% and 20% respectively between 2008 to 2010 (World Bank Data). Some other European 
countries that had accumulated high levels of debt in relation to their GDP were unable to repay 
their debts. The two options in that case were either to default on the debt or restructure it. The 
latter can be done by either extending the debt’s due date or by devaluing the currency so the 
debt becomes more affordable. When devaluing currency, in the medium-term, goods produced 
in the country become cheaper helping the manufacturing sector with an increase in exports. 
Needless to say that the above will need a period of adjustment and will not happen straight 
after the devaluation. On the contrary, when a country defaults or reconstructs its debt, it 
usually turns for help to IFIs, such as the IMF.  
Many studies have tried to examine IMF’s effect on the economy. The research looks into 
whether IMF programs lower inflation, improve current account balance and increase growth 
rate. However, measuring IMF’s success is difficult. Haque and Khan (1998) have identified 
two reasons why this is difficult. Firstly, a country’s economy faces many external shocks such 
as changes it the terms of trade that are outside of its control and affect the economy. The effect 
of the programme is difficult to isolate from the effect of the external shocks making it 
impossible to measure it. Secondly, it is also difficult to measure whether all the policy changes 
that come along with the programs lead to the desired outcomes as the dynamic linkages 
between the policy packages and the macroeconomic targets are not well established. In the 
literature there are different approaches that are used to evaluate the effect. There is the before 
and after approach that compares the macroeconomic performance of the country before and 
after the programme. Also, many researchers use the with or without approach which compares 
the performance of a country in the program (with) to a control group that is not under any 
program (without). Finally, in order to correct any biases that the first two methodologies have, 
a generalised evaluation where countries in a programme and countries not in a programme are 
compared after having been adjusted and controlled for exogenous influences and initial 
conditions. 
Apart from the impact on the economy, recessions influence the society. Cohen (2014) argues 
that the US society experienced fewer divorces and births but more violence after the recession. 
On the same side, World Health Organisation (2011) clearly relates recession to deteriorated 
mental health and Bartoll et al. (2013) report an increase of poor mental health in males in 
Spain. Another impact is the decrease in fertility rate. According to Sobotka et al. (2011) the 
fertility rate can be decreased in two stages: firstly, by a rise in unemployment and economic 
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uncertainty and secondly by cutting the support that a government provides to families i.e. 
decreased funds in childcare system or benefits to families. Örsal and Goldstein (2010) separate 
male and female unemployment. However, they have found an adverse relationship between 
fertility rates and both male and female unemployment. Adsera (2010) focuses only on female 
unemployment and finds that when it increases it delays substantially the first birth but also 
affects the second and third births. Macunovich (1996) and Berkowitz King (2005), focusing 
on female unemployment in US this time, report similar results to Adsera’s. Finally, having 
looked into France, Belgium and Netherlands, Neels (2010) concluded that high 
unemployment negatively affects first birth rates, more specifically those of woman aged under 
thirty.  
Another variable that is affected by a recession is marriage. Retherford et al. (2001) found that 
young people in Japan delay their marriages during a recession due to lower income. In 2003, 
Eun, again concentrating on Asia and in South Korea more specifically, concluded that the 
1997 crisis resulted in marriages’ postponement which is the most significant proximate 
determinant of declining fertility. Apart from delaying a new marriage, economic hardship can 
impact already existing marriages as well. Arkes and Shen (2013) argue that a crisis increases 
divorces only for couples that have been married between 6 to 10 years. However, literature 
suggests that divorces are pro-cyclical, meaning that divorce rate is higher when unemployment 
rate is lower and income is higher (Hellerstein and Morrill 2011; Scharler 2012; Chowdhury 
2013). The explanation is that divorces can be expensive and in periods of economic difficulty 
couples cannot afford them, thus they postpone them.  
Having discussed some of the effects of an economic recession in both the society and the 
economy it is time now to move on to explaining the structure of this thesis. It is worth starting 
by explaining what is sovereign debt and the cause of sovereign defaults. Debt is a function of 
every economy and government. Governments borrow to not only invest in infrastructure, such 
as schools, hospitals, roads and prisons but also to fund various benefits, tax cuts, pensions and 
many more. Many advanced economies experience high percentages of debt with Japan having 
the highest in the world with 234% of GDP as reported by OECD in 2016. Sometimes, 
countries with high debt to GDP ratio end up being unable to repay it, resulting in a default. In 
such cases, it is common to ask for help from the IMF. The IMF lends conditionally to ensure 
that the borrowing country will repay the remaining part of the debt by adopting sound 
economic and finance policies. Usually the conditions are austerity measures such as tax 




increases and/or decreases in pensions aiming to increase the government revenues. Worth 
noting that IMF defines itself as an organisation of countries with one of its primary aims being 
to sustain economic growth. Having said that, apart from ensuring debt repayment, its measures 
also target helping a country to overcome the economic difficulties and in the end, reach 
economic growth. The austerity measures, although they might be designed to help the country 
to stabilize the economy, their effects cannot only be restricted only in the economy but they 
may affect the society too. This is expected as the people experience circumstances that might 
be unusual.  
Therefore, in the second chapter we examine the determinants of sovereign defaults. We use 
macroeconomic factors such as debt, GDP volatility, general government balance, the current 
account balance and the outflows capital restriction index as constructed by Fernandez et al. 
(2015). However, as suggested by literature, politics also play a role on a country’s decision to 
default. Eaton and Gersovitz (1981) were first to separate a country’s ability from its 
willingness to repay debt. Consequently, we have decided to include political variables in the 
analysis. These are various indices that are widely used as political indicators such as the level 
of democracy, as measured by Polity IV, the International Country Risk Guide, a proxy of 
political stability, the overall economic freedom, provided by the Heritage Foundation and 
finally the world governance indicators. What we find is that both economics and politics 
impact sovereign defaults. When it comes to economics, the findings suggest that higher debt, 
fiscal imbalances and more specifically deficit and output volatility decrease a government’s 
ability to repay its debt. On the contrary, the higher the degree of democracy, overall economic 
freedom and the ICRG the lower the probability to default.  
As we have established that both economics and politics affect defaults we decided to examine 
how these countries perform after such an incident. Most countries after having experienced 
difficulties to repay debts turn to financial institutions for help as discussed previously. An 
example institution is the IMF, often referred to as the “lender of last resort”. Thus, in the next 
chapter we are trying to understand the IMF’s effect and more explicitly to understand whether 
it actually helps countries to achieve economic growth after crises. To address the endogeneity 
problem that may arise by having economic growth and IMF assistance in the same regression 
we use instruments. One of these is the temporary membership of UN Security Council, and as 
Dreher, Sturm and Vreeland (2009) have concluded, there is a significant relationship between 
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that and participation to IMF programs. The evidence shows that having IMF assistance 
increases the economic growth a year after receipt of the loan. 
Having checked the economic effect of IMF on sovereigns that resort to it for help, we have 
decided to examine its effect, if any, on sociological variables and more specifically suicide 
rates in chapter four. Suicide rates were chosen because economic crises have been blamed for 
their upsurges (Lopez Bernal et al. (2013), Isabel et al. (2016)) but at the same time not a lot 
of research has been published on the actual effects of economic crises against suicides. To 
explain them we use unemployment rate, GDP growth and IMF loans as a dummy on the 
economic side and the number of abortions per 1000 of live births, democracy and the alcohol 
consumption as litre per capital on the sociological side. The sample is split in various ways, 
that will be discussed in detail in the chapter, but what we can generally report is that both IMF 
intervention and unemployment, increase suicide rates whereas GDP growth is insignificant. 
Evidence also proves that the more democratic the country the fewer the suicides but at the 
same time the higher the number of abortions lead in more suicides. Finally, the most 
interesting result is related with the alcohol consumption. The more alcohol someone 
consumes, the less the possibility to commit suicide. 
Finally, chapter five aims to combine the results of the three chapters and highlight the main 
findings. However, considering the length restriction on this thesis and the extent of the three 
points above, we are aware that there is scope for further research on all these topics and their 
interrelations. Having said that, there is also a section with further recommendations that we 
believe will enrich the research and robustness of results on all three chapters. 









The aim of this study is to investigate the main factors causing the sovereign defaults. We use 
a panel of 99 countries to assess the impact that various macroeconomic and political risk 
indicators have on sovereign defaults on foreign currency bank loans, foreign currency bonds 
and local currency debt, utilizing an extended database constructed by the Bank of Canada. 
Our results suggest that the favourable economic indicators, lower debt levels and political 
stability all reduce the likelihood of default. We also find that the capital outflows restrictions 
are positively associated with higher probability of default. 
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2.1. Introduction  
Sovereign defaults are defined as a country’s failure to repay its debts. In case of such an event, 
the results for the defaulted country can be disastrous not only in the short term but also in the 
medium and long term as it will be difficult and expensive to borrow. During the last 35 years, 
sovereign defaults have become common. In Europe in the late 1980s several Eastern European 
countries (Romania, Poland, Hungary and Yugoslavia), experienced severe debt crises. The 
same decade, the oil price shock caused widespread defaults in South America followed by the 
Mexican default in 1994 which affected other Southern American economies. Its impact is also 
known as the “tequila effect”.  Three years later the East Asian crisis, which started in Thailand, 
spread very quickly to Indonesia, Korea and other East Asian countries. Russia followed soon 
after (1998) and more recently Iceland (2008) and Greece (2012). In the case of Greece more 
specifically, in March 2012, the International Swaps and Derivatives Association announced 
that it has triggered a restructuring “credit event” under credit default swap contracts. 
Approximately 97 per cent of privately held Greek bonds took a 53.5 per cent cut of the bond 
principal, about €107 billion reduction in Greece’s debt stock.  
Moody’s (2013) in an extended analysis of sovereign defaults records 24 such incidents since 
1997. Nine of the defaults were on both local and foreign currency government bonds, 8 were 
on local currency government bonds only and 7 affected foreign currency government bonds. 
At this point it should be stressed that these defaults have been observed at different debt levels.  
There are countries that have endured debt levels of more than 100% of GDP and have not 
experienced a default while others defaulted while maintaining lower debt levels. This suggests 
that other reasons besides economic factors play a role on the sovereign’s decision to default. 
An example would be the case of Hungary compared to Russia. Just after the collapse of the 
former Soviet Union, Hungary was on the verge of defaulting many times between the period 
of 1990 to 1994 while experiencing negative GDP growth. From fear on the impact of a default 
to the support that received from Western countries, it managed to find different ways to deal 
with this problem. On the other hand, Russia in 1998 decided to default. The use of the word 
decided was carefully chosen, as its government continued making domestic currency debt 
payments and only defaulted on foreign denominated bonds. Nonetheless, the examples 
demonstrated above show that a country can end up not repaying its debt either due to 
deteriorated economic fundamentals or due to political reasons.  Below is a graph from Bank 
of Canada that depicts the sovereign debt in default by six creditors. The spike that is observed 




according to the Bank of Canada is attributed to Greece’s, Ireland’s and Portugal’s debt 
restructuring.  
Figure 2.1: Total Sovereign Debt in Default by Creditor  Source: Bank of Canada 
 
What has led all these countries mentioned above to default? Are there any common 
characteristics with respect to their economies and politics? There is a large number of research 
papers, which attempt to explain the sovereign risk, observed sovereign bond yields and credit 
default swaps prices. Favero and Missale (2012) find evidence that the fluctuations in the euro 
area bond spreads are driven by fundamentals. In line with the above, Di Cesare at al. (2012) 
suggests that the levels of sovereign bond yields after the global financial crisis reached levels 
that can be explained by fiscal and macroeconomic fundamentals.  
In this paper we consider to which extent macroeconomic fundamentals and political indicators 
explain the sovereign defaults. We use the Sovereign defaults database (CRAG) constructed 
by the Bank of Canada, which includes defaults on debt in different subcategories of creditors; 
International Monetary Fund, International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, Paris 
Club, other official creditors, private creditors, foreign currency bank loans, foreign currency 
bonds and local currency debt, from 1960 until 2015. We analyse the effect of macroeconomic 
indicators for a set of 99 countries (see table 2.10 in Appendix 2.1) from 1985 until 2015 on 
sovereign defaults. Consistent with the literature, we find evidence that the debt to GDP ratio 
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and the real GDP growth volatility are statistically significant in explaining the sovereign 
defaults.  The innovation of this paper is that we also examine the explanatory power of 
indicators associated with the political risk on sovereign defaults. We incorporate four different 
indicators – the World Governance Indicators, the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG), 
the Polity IV and Economic Freedom- and find that the political risk captures a significant part 
in explaining the sovereign defaults.   
The paper is structured as follows. Firstly, we will review the relevant literature and then we 
will present the data and the method that we will use to examine the dependent variable. In the 
third section we will present and discuss the results. The final section will offer a summary of 
the paper and the concluding remarks.  
2.2. Literature Review 
There is a vast literature discussing sovereign defaults, their causes and determinants. Eaton 
and Gersovitz (1981) were the first ones to separate between bankruptcy of an individual 
economic agent in a national economy and a default by a government. When it comes to 
sovereign defaults they distinguish their willingness to pay their debt and whether they can 
actually repay. It can be argued that the latter is dependent on the economic situation of the 
country whereas the former is more linked to political factors. In line with the above, Verma 
(2002) used both structural and political variables, to explore what affects a country’s decision 
to default. He concluded that political factors affect a sovereign’s decision to default using a 
multivariate probit model. More specifically, countries with more democratic regimes tend to 
default more than others.  
The literature thus examines both economic and political variables as possible determinants of 
sovereign defaults. We will firstly discuss papers that examine macroeconomic variables and 
then move on to the ones that investigate political factors and their effects.  To start with, 
Arellano and Kocherlakota (2014) attempt to investigate the link between domestic debt default 
risk and sovereign debt in 18 emerging markets. Using temporal and country specific evidence 
they found that domestic defaults result in sovereign defaults and that this relationship is not 
causal. They argue that non-fundamental shocks lead to domestic defaults, which in turn result 
in fiscal pressures that may cause defaults on foreign loans.   
Catao and Sutton (2002), try to explain the variations in sovereign default probabilities by 
examining the role of macroeconomic volatility. They break down the latter into externally 




induced volatility, considering this to be linked to the trade, and policy induced volatility that 
is linked to foreign exchange, monetary and fiscal policies. Their sample consists of twenty-
five emerging economies over a period of thirty-one years from 1970 to 2001.  Their findings 
suggest that countries that demonstrated higher policy induced volatility are more likely to 
default. Sharp decreases of GDP growth and fiscal balances mostly precede these defaults as 
expected. However, they also find that there is a gradual deterioration of some other indicators, 
such as ratio of debt service to export.  
Hilscher and Nosbusch (2010) in their analysis of the determinants of sovereign risk find that 
the volatility of terms of trade has statistically and economically significant impact on 
sovereign yield spreads. As noted by Bulow and Rogoff (1989) any dollar revenues generated 
by the country’s trade activity could increase its ability to pay its external dollar denominated 
debt. Similarly, Eicher and Maltriz (2013) argue that the terms of trade are significant in 
explaining the sovereign risk because they affect the country’s ability to generate foreign 
currency revenues which can be used for foreign currency denominated debt. 
Bi (2012), introducing an endogenous and stochastic fiscal limit, which measures the country’s 
ability to pay its debts, argues that it relies on economic fundamentals, such as the fiscal policy, 
the size of the government, economic diversity and political uncertainty.  Baldacci et al. (2008) 
using a panel of 30 emerging market economies investigate the determinants of country risk 
premiums. Measured by the sovereign bond spreads they argue that fiscal and political factors 
drive the credit risk. Beirne (2013) analyses the drivers of sovereign risk as expressed by the 
sovereign yields and sovereign credit default swaps, shows that deterioration in countries’ 
fundamentals has a significant impact on both of them. The linkage between the 
macroeconomic fundamentals and the sovereign credit risk is investigated for six euro area 
countries by Yahya et al (2013). They conclude that the creditworthiness of the studied 
countries is affected by macroeconomic fundamentals such unemployment, debt to GDP ratio 
and gross fixed capital formation. Clark and Kassimatis (2015) using a new set of 
macroeconomic variables, which reflect investor’s expectations, find them significant in 
explaining and forecasting the sovereign credit spreads, expressed as proxy for the sovereign 
risk. According to Min (1998) inflation is another important factor in explaining the 
government borrowing cost for a sample of Asian and Latin American countries. On the 
contrary, Diaz and Gemmill (2006) who examine the factors affecting the creditworthiness of 
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four Latin American economies find no connection between inflation and the sovereign risk as 
expressed by the government bond spreads.  
Defaults episodes are more likely to occur in periods of recession. Tomz and Wright (2007) 
investigating whether there is a relationship between sovereign defaults and economic activity 
in the defaulting country. Covering 169 defaults for 175 sovereign entities they conclude that 
62 per cent of these defaults occurred in periods of economic recession. Cantor and Parker 
(1996) exploring the criteria underlying sovereign ratings conclude that factors such as the 
GDP growth and GDP per capita income are statistically significant in explain the rating 
decision by two leading ratings agencies, Moody’s Investors Service and Standard and Poor’s. 
In another study Mellios and Paget-Blance (2006) examine what are the factors that the three 
major rating agencies, Fitch Ratings, Moody’s and Standard and Poor’s consider when 
assigning their rating. Using a principal component analysis they find that the sovereign ratings 
are mainly determined by per capita income, government income, real exchange rate changes, 
inflation rate and default history. Similarly, Afonso et al. (2007) in a European Union focused 
empirical analysis over a period from 1995 to 2005 conclude that the GDP per capita, real GDP 
growth, government debt, government effectiveness, external debt and external reserves, 
sovereign default indicator as well as being member of European Union are the main indicators 
that the three largest rating agencies consider for the rating decisions. 
 In the body of literature, we found several papers trying to identify the determinants of 
sovereign defaults using variables that are indicators of defaults instead of using the variable 
per se. Below, we will provide an overview of the most interesting and relevant ones.  We will 
start with Maltritz (2012) who uses a Bayesian Model Averaging (BMA) in his attempt to 
identify the determinants of default risk in countries of the European Union. As an indicator 
for risk he uses government yield spreads in all EMU member states from 1999 until 2009.  
What he finds, after having tested various variables, is that government debt to GDP, budget 
balance to GDP and more specifically the deficit significantly affect the dependent variable.  
Alesina et al (1995), examined the borrowing rates and the debt of OECD countries. They find 
a significant relationship in both the sovereign yield spreads, which is often an indicator of 
default, and public debt in countries where the debt to GDP ratio is not stable. Lastly, another 
paper that uses an untraditional way to examine the sovereign default risk is the one of Alfonso 
(2003). Using data from S&P and Moody’s he tries to identify the determinants of sovereign 




credit ratings. He argues that GDP per capita, external debt as a percentage of exports, inflation 
and real growth rate are significant in the determination of the credit ratings.  
Moving on to the literature focused on the political risk, Hatchondo et al. (2007), identify the 
political factors, borrowing costs and resources as the factors that determine whether a country 
will default or not, based on the existing literature. Empirical studies suggest that countries 
have greater probabilities to default in periods where the available resources in a country are 
low (Tomz and Wright (2007) and Cantor and Packer (1996)) and when borrowing costs for a 
country are high (Arora and Cerisola (2001) and Lambertini (2001)).  Finally, different political 
factors seem to play a role on whether a country will default or not. Political instability has 
been found statistically significant by Citron and Nickelsburg (1987) and Balkan (1992). The 
latter also reports that democracy plays a role in defaults. In line with that Kohlscheen (2003) 
finds that countries with parliamentary democracies have a lower probability of default than 
compared to countries with presidential systems. Alesina and Tabellini (1990) also show that 
political instability increases the probability of a default.  
In a bit more detail, Balkan (1992) examines if and how the level of democracy and political 
instability affect the country’s probability to repay its debt. The method adopted in the paper 
is a probit regression run in 33 countries over a period of 13 years, starting in 1971. The choice 
of the countries was based on the criteria of them being developing nations with an external 
debt higher than one billion dollars.  In line with others in the literature he states that democracy 
decreases the default probabilities whilst high level of political instability increases them. On 
the note of political stability, Manasse and Roubini (2005)) amongst other variables that have 
examined is whether a country has presidential elections in less than five years which is 
considered a sign of instability. Using a Classification and Regression Tree Analysis (CART) 
find that these countries have increased probability to default when international capital 
markets are tight.  
Cuadra and Sapriza (2008), in their attempt to test the interaction of political factors with 
defaults use a neoclassical open economy model. The model has two types of political parties, 
each period one of the two in power and foreign lenders. They also assume that the only asset 
traded in financial markets is a noncontigent one period bond. This bond is available only to 
ruling political. The results of the model reinforce the vast literature that politics play indeed a 
role in a sovereign’s likelihood to default. What they find is that unstable and more polarised 
economies lead in both higher default rates and volatility of interest rate spreads. 
Essays of Socio Economic Ills  
 
13 
Yu (2016) has also tried to understand whether political factors affect the probability of a 
country to default. He examines 68 countries, a mix of developed and emerging economies, 
from 1970 until 2010 using a panel logit model. What Yu argues is that apart from economic 
reasons, political associated variables play a role in a country’s probability to default. For 
example, Tabellini and Ozler (1991) report that when two types of government with multiple 
equilibria alternate in power, defaults are more probable. Also, Sapriza and Cuadra (2008) 
prove that a government can choose to default when election results are uncertain by taking 
excessive debt, as a preventive move. Coming back to Yu, his main findings suggest that 
political stability is a significant factor that determines this probability. More specifically, more 
democratic countries that are political stable will less likely default whereas higher chances of 
political turnover along with younger political regimes have the opposite effect.  
Baldacci et al (2011), focus on emerging markets only in their attempt to understand the 
determinants of sovereign defaults. They study bond spreads as a spike in them is translated as 
a higher probability to default. Their sample consists of 46 countries over a period of 11 years 
from 1997 to 2008. They find that both political and fiscal factors affect the credit risk of these 
countries. More precisely, in periods of economic downturn the markets are less tolerant in 
institutional risk asking for an extra premium to lend them by increasing the spreads.  
Rijckeghem and Weder (2008) show that to explain defaults in both domestic and external 
obligations, the political institutions of a country should be examined.  Using a non- parametric 
technique, to exploit the advantage of identifying patterns in the data that this technique offers 
compared to a standard logit, prove that indeed political factors matter in defaults. For example, 
when economic fundamentals are sufficiently strong, democracies with a parliament system 
assure that a default on an external debt will be avoided. In dictatorships on the other side, 
assuming the same as above, high stability and tenure guarantee that the country will not default 
on its domestic debt. 
Finally, Eichler and Plaga (2016) take a different approach to the issue. They examine the links 
between sovereign bond holdings and political factors, as these can be an indicator of a default. 
They focus on US investors that hold bonds in 60 countries between 2003 to 2013. US investors 
seem to reduce their investment in bonds when there is political uncertainty. In cases, where 
the default risk is high or a country has already experienced one, they prefer to invest to country 
bonds with higher political constraints. However, when none of these two exist they prefer 
sovereigns with few political constraints on the government. 




2.3. Methodology and Data  
2.3.1 Data and Variables 
In our analysis we use the Bank of Canada Sovereign defaults database constructed by Beers 
and Mavalwalla. Consistent with the literature and the rating agencies, Beers and Mavalwalla 
(2017) consider a default event has occurred when debt is service is not paid on the due date 
or within a specific time frame in any of the following circumstances1: 
• Agreements between governments and creditors that reduce rates and/or extend maturities 
on outstanding debt. 
• Government exchange offers to creditors where existing debt is swapped for new debt on 
less-economic terms. 
• Government purchases of debt at substantial discounts to par. 
• Government redenomination of foreign currency debt into new local currency obligations 
on less-economic terms. 
• Swaps of sovereign debt for equity (usually relating to privatization programs) on less-
economic terms. 
• Retrospective taxes targeting sovereign debt service payments. 
• Conversion of central bank notes into new currency of less-that-equivalent face value. 
GRAG’s sovereign database2 presents data for sovereign defaults from 1960 to 2016 for the 
creditors’ categories listed below: 
• International Monetary Fund (IMF) 
• International Bank of Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) 
• Paris Club 
• Other official creditors 
• Private creditors 
• Foreign currency bank loans 
• Foreign currency bonds 
• Local currency debt 
 
                                                          
1 Bank of Canada, Database of Sovereign Defaults 2015, page 2. 
2 Available at https://www.bankofcanada.ca/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/r101-revised-june2017.pdf 
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The analysis used in this paper is in line with the practices followed by credit rating agencies. 
Their method is based in measuring the probability of missed payments of the government and 
central bank bills, notes, bonds and bank loans, not the probability of missed payments of loans 
contracted from the IMF, the multilateral lending institutions and other official creditors. 
Moody’s Investor Services (2008) in a survey about the post-1960 history of sovereign defaults 
presents 38 case of sovereign bond defaults. Moody’s survey unveils that 45 per cent of defaults 
have been on foreign currency bonds, while 34 per cent affected local currency bonds and 21 
per cent were on a joint basis.  
We attempt to investigate the relationship between the sovereign default and the imposition of 
capital restrictions over a period of 20 years for 99 countries. To achieve this, we use the dataset 
of capital restrictions constructed by Fernandez et. al (2015). For the construction of the dataset 
Fernandez et al (2015) based on the methodology developed by Schindler (2009), but including 
more countries, more years and more asset categories.  The most important feature of this 
dataset is the fact that it disaggregates the information of the capital restriction on inflows or 
outflows. The sample covers the period 1985 to 2015 and the following ten asset categories: 
• Money market instruments, which includes securities with original maturity of one year or 
less. 
• Bonds or the other debt securities with original maturity of more than one year. 
• Equity, shares or other securities. 
• Collective investment securities such as mutual funds and investment trusts. 
• Financial credit and credits other than commercial credits granted by all residents to 
nonresidents and vice versa. 
• Derivatives. 
• Commercial credits for operations linked with international trade transactions. 
• Guarantees, Sureties and Financial Back-Up Facilities provided by residents to 
nonresidents and vice versa. 
• Real Estate transactions representing the acquisition of real estate not associated with 
direct investment. 
• Direct investment accounts for transactions made for the purpose of establishing lasting 
economic relations both abroad by residents and domestically by residents. 
 




The empirical investigation concentrates on explaining the sovereign defaults across a diverse 
set of countries and time range. To try to achieve that we use two different groups of variables; 
economic and political. The first group of variables that we use include several macroeconomic 
fundamentals. The debt to GDP ratio is a proxy used to determine whether a country can repay 
its obligation. A higher the debt to GDP ratio is associated with a higher probability of default. 
We also incorporate in our analysis the output volatility, as a proxy for the country’s capacity 
to absorb shocks and adapt to changes. In Figure 2.2 we calculated its average based on the 
countries in the analysis and we present the average per continents. The same for Figures 2.3 
to 2.9 that follow. 
Figure 2.2: General Government Debt (as a percentage of GDP) 
 
Real GDP growth (Figure 2.3), which is defined as year on year percentage change of real 
GDP, is an indicator of how solid economic performance makes the economy stronger and less 
likely to default on its debts. We calculate the standard deviation of the real GDP growth rate 
over 4 years of historical data, plus projected output over the next 3 years. Higher output 
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Figure 2.3: Real GDP growth rate 
 
We use the current account balance (as a percentage of GDP – Figure 2.4) as a proxy for the 
country’s external solvency, which is linked with its level of external indebtedness. In the event 
of a sudden stop in financing, countries with large current account imbalances can be forced to 
undertake sharp macroeconomic adjustment.  Therefore, we expect the current account to have 

















Figure 2.4: Current account balance (as a percentage of GDP) 
 
Another variable, which characterizes the country’s financing needs is the fiscal balance 
(Figure 2.5). A country with a stronger fiscal position should have less probability of default. 
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Figure 2.5: General government fiscal balance (as a percentage of GDP) 
 
Moving on to the political variables, we will start with the International Country Risk Guide 
(ICRG – Figure 2.6).  The ICRG reports three subcategories of risk: the political, financial and 
economic, which are updated monthly for 140 countries. For the above three, a separate index 
is created with a 100 points as a maximum for the political risk and 50 points for the other two. 
The scores to the indices are given by a business oriented model. The model quantifies a risk 
by examining country specific elements considering 22 variables.  For the 22 variables 30 
metrics are used to assess them. In this paper, we will only use the political risk index. This 
index comprises of 12 variables which exhibit both social and political traits.  Some examples 
are internal conflict, socioeconomic conditions, corruption and bureaucratic quality. These 12 
then get points with the maximum ranging from 4 to 12 that attribute to the total of the 100 





















Figure 2.6: International country risk guide indicator 
 
The next variable that we thought might be worth to examine is democracy. Polity IV (Figure 
2.7) is a research project that measures democracy from 1800 until present and it is commonly 
used in the political science research. We chose this data source as compared to other databases 
as polity provides data for a greater range of both years and countries. The database covers 167 
countries as it only covers states of a population of 500,000 and more. The score that is assigned 
to them ranges between -10 to 10. The two extremes represent hereditary monarchy and 
consolidated democracy respectively. From -10 to -6 autocracies, +6 to +10 democracies and 
the middle range from -5 to +5 anocracies. 3 
                                                          
3 Anocracy, is characterized by institutions and political elites that are far less capable of performing fundamental tasks and 
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Figure 2.7: Polity IV 
 
Another source of data widely used by researchers is the worldwide governance indicators 
(WGI – Figure 2.8). WGI report both individual and aggregate governance indicators from 
1996 until 2015 (at the moment that this paper is written it has been announced that 2016 will 
soon be released) for over 200 countries. The way that authority in a country is exercised via 
its traditions and institutions is what defines governance. To measure it in every country, the 
following six dimensions, that are informed by 30 underlying sources are used: voice and 
accountability, political stability and absence of violence, government effectiveness, regulatory 
quality rule of law and control of corruption. In this paper, we use all six indicators, 
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Figure 2.8: World Governance Indicator (average) 
 
The last index that we use to as an independent variable is the economic freedom index (Figure 
2.9). The Index has been created by the Heritage Foundation and the Wall street Journal yearly 
since 1995. It reports the relationship between economic freedom and various other positive 
economic and social goals in 186 countries. It is measured based on twelve freedoms that form 
four categories: the rule of law, government size, regulatory efficiency and open markets. The 
index gets a score of a maximum 100 that is calculated by averaging the score that is given to 
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Figure 2.9: Economic Freedom Index 
2.4. Empirical Model 
The dependent variable, as mentioned in the previous section, is sovereign defaults. The values 
that it takes is 1 in case of a reported default in a country and 0 otherwise. Since we are dealing 
with a binary variable, the most appropriate model to use is either a probit or a logit. The 
advantage of these two models compared to a simple linear OLS model is that they produce an 
S-shaped curve that respects the dependent variable boundaries of 0 and 1. The difference 
between them two is the assumption on the distribution of errors. Logit assumes that 
distribution is logistic whilst the probit that it is a standard normal distribution.    
As we have a panel dataset we need to account for any country specific effects leading us to 
use fixed effects (fe) model rather than random effects (re). To make sure that this is the best 
approach, we run a Hausman test which confirms that fe is the model we need to use. Debt and 
current account balance have been lagged one year as their impact is more likely to be visible 
a year after.  
In this paper we perform both probit and logit analysis in our sample. The intention is to better 
understand if and how both sets of variables affect the independent one. To begin with, in the 
tests that we perform we include only macroeconomic variables ((eq 2.1))  
𝒴𝑖 = 𝛽𝑖 + 𝛽𝑑 𝑑𝑖 + 𝛽𝑣 𝑣𝑖 + 𝛽𝑔 𝑔𝑖 + 𝛽𝑐 𝑐𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖   (eq 2.1) 
 
1995 2000 2005 2010 2015
Africa Americas Asia Europe Oceania





where 𝒴𝑖 sovereign defaults, 𝑑𝑖 debt to GDP ratio ,𝑣𝑖   GDP growth volatility,   𝑔𝑖 general 
government balance , 𝑐𝑖current account balance  
Then we run all the regressions again with more than one macroeconomic variables but only 
one political variable at the time((eq 2.2) (eq 2.3) (eq 2.4) (eq 2.5)).  
𝒴𝑖 = 𝛽𝑖 + 𝛽𝑑 𝑑𝑖 + 𝛽𝑣 𝑣𝑖 + 𝛽𝑔 𝑔𝑖 + 𝛽𝑐 𝑐𝑖 + 𝛽𝑤𝑤𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖   (eq 2.2)   
𝒴𝑖 = 𝛽𝑖 + 𝛽𝑑 𝑑𝑖 + 𝛽𝑣 𝑣𝑖 + 𝛽𝑔 𝑔𝑖 + 𝛽𝑐 𝑐𝑖 + 𝛽𝑧𝑧𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖  (eq 2.3) 
𝒴𝑖 = 𝛽𝑖 + 𝛽𝑑 𝑑𝑖 + 𝛽𝑣 𝑣𝑖 + 𝛽𝑔 𝑔𝑖 + 𝛽𝑐 𝑐𝑖 + 𝛽𝑝 𝑝𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖  (eq 2.4) 
𝒴𝑖 = 𝛽𝑖 + 𝛽𝑑 𝑑𝑖 + 𝛽𝑣 𝑣𝑖 + 𝛽𝑔 𝑔𝑖 + 𝛽𝑐 𝑐𝑖 + 𝛽𝑓 𝑓𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖  (eq 2.5) 
 
where 𝒴𝑖 sovereign defaults, 𝑑𝑖 debt to GDP ratio ,𝑣𝑖 GDP growth volatility, 𝑔𝑖  general 
government balance , 𝑐𝑖current account balance and  𝑤𝑖 world governance indicators (eq 2.2), 
𝑧𝑖 is the international country risk guide (ICRG) (eq 2.3), 𝑝𝑖  democracy as in polity IV (eq 
2.4),  𝑓𝑖 economic freedom (eq 2.5) 
 
Finally, we add in the both sets of regressions the overall outflow restriction variable, once 
with only economic variables (eq 2.6) and then with one political variable at the time (eq 2.7), 
(eq 2.8), (eq 2.9),( eq 2.10) as above. All the regressions are firstly run with the fixed effects 
logit model and then the probit. 
𝒴𝑖 = 𝛽𝑖 + 𝛽𝑘 𝑘𝑖 + 𝛽𝑑 𝑑𝑖 + 𝛽𝑣 𝑣𝑖 + 𝛽𝑔 𝑔𝑖 + 𝛽𝑐 𝑐𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖  (eq 2.6) 
𝒴𝑖 = 𝛽𝑖 + 𝛽𝑘 𝑘𝑖 + 𝛽𝑑 𝑑𝑖 + 𝛽𝑣 𝑣𝑖 + 𝛽𝑔 𝑔𝑖 + 𝛽𝑐 𝑐𝑖 + 𝛽𝑤𝑤𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖  (eq 2.7) 
𝒴𝑖 = 𝛽𝑖 + 𝛽𝑘 𝑘𝑖 + 𝛽𝑑 𝑑𝑖 + 𝛽𝑣 𝑣𝑖 + 𝛽𝑔 𝑔𝑖 + 𝛽𝑐 𝑐𝑖 + 𝛽𝑧𝑧𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖   (eq 2.8) 
𝒴𝑖 = 𝛽𝑖 + 𝛽𝑘 𝑘𝑖 + 𝛽𝑑 𝑑𝑖 + 𝛽𝑣 𝑣𝑖 + 𝛽𝑔 𝑔𝑖 + 𝛽𝑐 𝑐𝑖 + 𝛽𝑝 𝑝𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖  (eq 2.9) 
𝒴𝑖 = 𝛽𝑖 + 𝛽𝑘 𝑘𝑖 + 𝛽𝑑 𝑑𝑖 + 𝛽𝑣 𝑣𝑖 + 𝛽𝑔 𝑔𝑖 + 𝛽𝑐 𝑐𝑖 + 𝛽𝑓 𝑓𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖  (eq 2.10) 
where 𝒴𝑖 sovereign defaults, 𝑘𝑖 capital restriction outflow index, 𝑑𝑖 debt to GDP ratio, 𝑣𝑖 GDP 
growth volatility, 𝑔𝑖 general government balance , 𝑐𝑖current account balance and  𝑤𝑖 world 
governance indicators (eq 2.7), 𝑧𝑖 is the international country risk guide (ICRG) (eq 2.8), 𝑝𝑖  
democracy as in polity IV (eq 2.9),  𝑓𝑖 economic freedom (eq 2.10) 




2.4.1 Interaction Term 
To expand and enhance the results we have decided to include an interaction term. Its 
introduction in the regression will help in a better understanding of the explanatory variables 
and its effects on the dependent one. The interaction term is simply the product of two 
explanatory variables and its interpretation is the effect of one explanatory variable for different 
values of another explanatory variable. The interaction terms included in our regression is the 
product of one political variable with one political at a time, resulting in twenty regressions 
run. One example below is equation (eq 2.11). 
𝒴𝑖 = 𝛽𝑖 + 𝛽𝑘 𝑘𝑖 + 𝛽𝑑 𝑑𝑖 + 𝛽𝑣 𝑣𝑖 + 𝛽𝑔 𝑔𝑖 + 𝛽𝑐 𝑐𝑖 + 𝛽𝑤𝑤𝑖 + 𝛽𝑤𝑑𝑤𝑖 ∗ 𝑑𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖  (eq 2.11) 
 
where 𝒴𝑖 sovereign defaults, 𝑘𝑖 capital restriction outflow index, 𝑑𝑖 debt to GDP ratio, 𝑣𝑖 GDP 
growth volatility,  𝑔𝑖 general government balance, 𝑐𝑖current account balance,  𝑤𝑖 world 
governance indicators and 𝑤𝑖 ∗ 𝑑𝑖 the interaction term of world governance indicators with the 
debt to GDP ratio 
 Needless to say that the main effects are still thought the coefficients of the main variables. At 
this stage, a couple of things should be noted before demonstrating the results that will help us 
understand them better. Firstly, there are cases where the significance or the coefficients of the 
variables that form the interaction term give very different results to the main regression. The 
reason behind it is likely to be that when the term is included, the coefficient for the variable 
demonstrates its effect when the other variable of the term is zero also called the conditional 
effect. However, in a regression without an interaction term it shows its connection with the 
dependent averaged over all the levels of the rest explanatory variables. Secondly, apart from 
the coefficients the constant can also change. The change stems from the fact that the variables 
now are centered at the mean compared to before when they were uncentered.   
2.5. Estimation Results 
2.5.1 Regression Analysis Results 
In this section we will present the estimation analysis results. We will start by presenting and 
discussing the logit results with only the macroeconomic variables, then the ones with one 




political variable at a time but excluding the overall outflow restriction index and then the set 
of results when it is included.  
The analysis begins by examining the impact of the general government balance to GDP ratio, 
the GDP volatility, the one-year lagged debt to GDP ratio and the one-year lagged current 
account balance as a percentage to GDP. All the variables are positive and significant at the 1 
per cent level apart from the lagged current account balance that does not have any effect on 
the dependent variable. What the results indicate is that when debt, fiscal deficits and GDP 
volatility increase the probability of sovereign default increases. This is what we expected as 
deteriorated macroeconomic variables can result in a country’s inability to repay its debts and 
could lead in a default. However, we felt that maybe the effect of the current account balance 
result it is visible on the same year. So we re-run the regression but this time with the variable 
not lagged. The results remain the same as before (Table 2.1). 
The next step is to try and understand the effect of political variables on the defaults. As 
explained above, one political variable at a time will be used in conjunction with the 
macroeconomic variables. A brief reminder of the variables that we use at this point will be 
useful:  PolityIV as a measure of democracy, the rule of law, the overall economic freedom 
index and finally the International Country Risk Guide index (ICRG). Increase in debt and 
GDP volatility in all four cases increases the sovereign default probability whilst current 
account balance (lagged or no) is insignificant.  When it comes to the fiscal balance to GDP 
ratio the results are not very consistent. The fiscal balance as a percentage of GDP when the 
level of democracy and the ICRG are included, result in a significant and positive effect but 
once overall economic freedom and the average of WGI are introduced it becomes 
insignificant. The political variables in all cases are significant and negative. Meaning that the 
higher is the level of democracy, the economic freedom, the WGI and the higher the political 










                               Table 2.1: Logit Regression results 
Sovereign Defaults (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 












































WGI   -3.1446 
(0.8073)*** 
      
Polity IV     -0.1270 
(0.0311)*** 
    
Economic Freedom       -0.0800 
(0.0251)*** 
  
ICRG         -0.0881       
(0.0145)*** 
Number of countries  45 38 45 45 86 
Number of observations 1177 681 1117 648 2146 
Notes: Absolute values of t statistics are shown in parentheses. Significance: * 10%; ** 5%; *** 1%. 
In the regression we also add the overall outflow restriction index. The index has a significant 
positive effect on defaults, similar to debt to GDP ratio and GDP growth volatility. The current 
account balances, both lagged and current, are insignificant. Compared to before though the 
introduction of the restriction index changes the government balance to become insignificant.  
We then add the political variables and re run the model. The outflow restriction index is 
positively significant when we include ICRG, polity and rule of law; only at the 10% 
significance level in the latter. It is insignificant however when the overall economic index is 
included. Debt to GDP ratio, GDP growth volatility and current account (current or lagged) 
balance as a percentage of GDP behave the same as before; the first two increase the probability 
of a sovereign to default whereas the third has no effect. The last one when it comes to the 
economic explanatory variables is the fiscal balance as a percentage of GDP which is found 




insignificant in all cases. Lastly, all the political variables apart from the level of democracy 
have negative significant effects on defaults (Table 2.2).  
Table 2.2: Logit regression results including capital restriction outflows 
Sovereign Defaults (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 



























































WGI    -2.4913 
(0.8959) *** 
      
Polity IV     -0.0426  
(0.0477) 
    
Economic Freedom        -0.0649 
(0.0273) **   
  
ICRG         -0.0406  
(0.0136) 
*** 
Number of countries  39 38 39 35 32 
Number of 
observations 
734 681 734 648 575 
Notes: Absolute values of t statistics are shown in parentheses. Significance: * 10%; ** 5%; *** 1%. 
All the results that were reported above seem to have similarities. Debt to GDP ratio and GDP 
growth volatility were always found to be positively significant something that we have 
expected, whereas the current account balance, either current or lagged, did not have any effect 
on the defaults whatsoever.  The general government balance as a percentage of GDP gives 
very inconsistent results. It is positive and significant in the cases where in the regression we 
have only the macroeconomic indicators and in the ones where polity and ICRG are included. 
In all other cases, both including the outflow restrictions or not is insignificant. To continue, 
when the overall outflow restrictions index increases, the probability of sovereign default 
increases every time except for the time that in the regression the overall economic freedom 
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index is included. In that case the explanatory variable becomes insignificant. Finally, all the 
political indicators have a negative impact on sovereign defaults apart from the level of 
democracy that loses its significance when the overall outflow restriction index is included.  
In order to deal with multi-colinearity problems between the World Governance Indicators we 
use the Principal Components Analysis (PCA)4.  PCA can be used to reduce the dimension of 
a data set and extract the significant information from the table. In Table 2.3 we have computed 
the new variables, namely principal components, which are the linear combinations of the 
original variables and we-re run the logit regression. 
                                                          
4 The principal component analysis is performed using STATA. 




Table 2.3: Logit regression results including principal component  
Sovereign Defaults (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 


















GDP Growth Volatility 0.0039 










(0.0009)***   
0.0036   
(0.0009)*** 
0.0036   
(0.0010)*** 




































(0.4872) **   
              
Political Stability   -0.8304 
(0.3193) ** 
            
Government 
Effectiveness 
    -1.7877 
(0.7319) **   
          
Regulatory       -1.4636  
(0.4872) *** 
        
Control of Corruption         -1.1285 
(0.6146)* 
      
Rule of Law           -2.1057  
(0.6439)*** 
    
Avg WGI             -3.1446  
(0.8073)*** 
  
PCA               -1.2651  
(0.3227)*** 
Number of countries  38 38 38 38 38 38 38 38 
Number of observations 681 681 681 681 681 681 681 681 
Notes: Absolute values of t statistics are shown in parentheses. Significance: * 10%; ** 5%; *** 1%.
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As we can observe from Table 2.4 the Component (1) explains 86.38 per cent of the total 
variance. Moreover, the scree plot of the eigenvalue suggests that Component (1) is higher than 
1. Therefore, we choose to retain Component 1 in our analysis. In Figure 2.10 the scree plot of 
Eigenvalues after the PCA as an output of Stata is represented. 
Table 2.4: PCA 
Component Eigenvalue Difference Proportion Cumulative 
Comp1 5.1825 4.84471 0.8638 0.8638 
Comp2 0.337797 0.052224 0.0563 0.9201 
Comp3 0.285573 0.177195 0.0476 0.9676 
Comp4 0.108378 0.0629611 0.0181 0.9857 
Comp5 0.0454165 0.00508507 0.0076 0.9933 
Comp6 0.0403314 . 0.0067 1 
 
Figure 2.10: Eigenvalues after PCA (STATA output) 
 





The robustness of the results is an important issue. To ensure that the results are robust, we run 
the same regression using the probit model now instead of the logit and we also introduce the 
interaction terms, as was discussed in the methodology section. Finally, using a three year 
moving average for debt, we run the logit regression again to examine whether the results will 
change. 
2.5.2.1 Probit 
Using the same variables and running exactly the same regressions as above we find that the 
results do not differ from before. The only change that we can report is that the overall outflow 
restrictions from a 10% significance level become insignificant when the WGI is included. 
(Tables 2.5 and 2.6). 
Table 2.5: Probit Regression Results 
Sovereign 
Defaults 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Debt to GDP ratio 
(lagged) 
 0.0006   
(0.0001)***   
0.0005   
 (0.0001)***    











(0.0005) ***   






























WGI    -2.2444 
(0.2456)*** 
      
Polity IV      -0.0748 
(0.0162)*** 
    
Economic 
Freedom 
      -0.0664 
(0.0139)*** 
  




99 98 95 93 86 
Number of 
observations 
2559 1743 2479 1707 2146 
Notes: Absolute values of t statistics are shown in parentheses. Significance: * 10%; ** 5%; *** 1%. 
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Table 2.6: Probit regression results including capital outflows 
Sovereign Defaults (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 















(0.0001)***   
0.0005 
(0.0001)***    
0.0005 





 0.0020   
(0.0005)*** 
























-0.0001    







WGI   -2.1465  
(0.2662)***   
      
Polity IV     -0.0297  
(0.0237)  
    
Economic Freedom       -0.0584   
(0.0149)**   
  
ICRG         -0.0325 
(0.0001)*** 
Number of countries  98 98 94 93 85 
Number of 
observations 
1830 1743 1768 1707 1504 
Notes: Absolute values of t statistics are shown in parentheses. Significance: * 10%; ** 5%; *** 1%. 
2.5.2.2 Interaction Term Results 
To understand better the effect of the political explanatory variables to sovereign defaults we 
introduced the interaction term. The interaction terms are formed using one of the economic 
variables, apart from the current account balance that is always insignificant, along with one 
political indicator at a time. We then run all the regressions again and discuss the results below. 
Before we move to the presentation of the results it is worth reminding that from the tests above 
we find that, all the political variables had a negative effect whereas all the economic variables 
a positive effect on sovereign defaults.  




The first term created contains the overall economic freedom index. When it interacts with the 
GDP volatility and the fiscal balance, is negative, but when with the debt is insignificant. This 
means that the political variables have a stronger effect on defaults than GDP volatility and 
government balance but not stronger than debt. The World Governance Indicators and the 
economic stability (ICRG) generate very similar results. Both their impact is stronger, when 
interacting with the GDP volatility, as the term has a negative sign, but not with debt and 
government balance where it is insignificant. Finally, the effect of the level of democracy is 
lower than debt, as we find the term to be positive and no effect with the rest. The same 
procedure as above was followed again with the addition of the overall outflow restrictions. 
What we find is that only the overall economic freedom index has a stronger effect compared 
to overall outflow and all the rest are insignificant. In Table 2.7 the combination of the columns 
with each row represent the interaction terms.  











   ICRG 








































Notes: Absolute values of t statistics are shown in parentheses. Significance: * 10%; ** 5%; *** 1%. 
2.5.2.3 Three-year Moving Average on Debt 
Finally, we test how the variables behave when instead of using one year debt lagged, we use 
its three year moving average. Tables 2.8 and 2.9 depict the results of the logit regression when 
excluding and including the outflow restriction index respectively. 
Essays of Socio Economic Ills  
 
35 
Table 2.8: Logit using a three year moving average on debt 
Sovereign Defaults (1) (2) (3) (4) 
3 years moving average 
Debt to GDP ratio 




  0.0660        
(0.0097)*** 
0.0356          
(0.0054)*** 
GDP Growth Volatility 0.0022    
(0.0010)** 




0.0018           
(0.0009)** 
General Gov Balance -0.0002    
(0.0002) 
0.0004***   
(0.0001) 
  -0.0002  
(0.0002) 
0.0002         
(0.0001) 
Current account lagged -0.0003      
(0.0002) 
0.0001     
(0.0002) 
 -0.0002          
(0.0002 ) 




      
Polity IV     -0.1131 
(0.0323)*** 
    
Economic Freedom       -0.0342   
(0.0253) 
  
ICRG         -0.0906          
(0.0142)*** 
Number of countries 38 45 35 37 
Number of observations 720 1233 685 956 
Notes: Absolute values of t statistics are shown in parentheses. Significance: * 10%; ** 5%; *** 1%. 
 
What we can observe from the table above is that the results are the same as before with the 
debt having a positive significant impact on defaults whereas all the political variables a 









Table 2.9: Logit using a three year moving average on debt including kao 
Sovereign Defaults (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Kao Index  0.8206     
(0.9372) 
  1.0767  
(0.8019) 
 0.2765    
 (0.9179) 
0.5346   
 (0.9304) 
3 years moving average 
Debt to GDP ratio 








GDP Growth Volatility 0.0023    
(0.0010) ** 
0.0018 
(0.0009) *       
0.0027   
(0.0010 )*** 
0.0012          
(0.0011 ) 
General Gov Balance  -0.0002      
(0.0002) 
 -0.0002      
(0.0002) 
-0.0002      
(0.0002) 
 -0.0002       
(0.0002) 
Current account lagged  -0.0003       
(0.0002) 
 -0.0001       
(0.0002) 
-0.0002       
(0.0002) 
0.0003         
(0.0003) 
WGI -1.8285  
(0.8602)** 
      
Polity IV    -0.0403      
(0.0489) 
    
Economic Freedom       -0.0342      
(0.0279) 
  
ICRG        -0.0342   
(0.0128)*** 
Number of countries 38 39 35 32 
Number of observations 720 776 685 576 
Notes: Absolute values of t statistics are shown in parentheses. Significance: * 10%; ** 5%; *** 1%. 
 
However, the introduction of the three year moving average on debt, instead of the lagged debt 
seems to weaken the impact of the capital restriction outflow index where it becomes 
insignificant. On the political indices side, the only change compared to before is the economic 
freedom which again becomes insignificant.   
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2.6. Conclusions  
The purpose of our empirical investigation is to analyse the determinants of the sovereign 
defaults. We employ a panel of 99 countries using annual data over the period 1985 – 2015. 
Our analysis is based on the Bank’s Credit Rating Assessment Group (CRAG) default’s 
database constructed by the Bank of Canada. This paper contributes to the literature not only 
by examining the impact of both macroeconomic and political indicators on the sovereign 
defaults, but emphasizing on the quality of the political institutions and the capital controls. 
Our results (figure 2.11) indicate that the sustainability of a government’s debt is a fundamental 
consideration in sovereign risk analysis. Higher debt ratio might be interpreted by the market 
participants as a warning signal about the country’s future ability to repay its debts. The default 
risk is also positively affected by the fiscal imbalances. We show that higher fiscal deficits are 
associated with increased likelihood of default. We also incorporate the real GDP growth 
volatility in our analysis and provide evidence that increased output volatility weakens the 
government ability to repay its outstanding debt obligations. As a measure of country’s external 
solvency and its ability to generate foreign revenues, we introduced in our empirical analysis 
the current account balance as a percentage of GDP. The results indicate an insignificant 
relationship between the current account and the incidence of sovereign defaults. We can argue 
that the current account imbalances (deficits) do not necessarily imply higher risk, as well-
managed countries run current account deficits in cases of a country’s expansion. 
Figure 2.11: Summary of findings  
 





However, we believe that sound macroeconomic fundamentals are not the only factors to assess 
a country’s credit worthiness. Therefore, four different political indicators are included to 
investigate the effect of political risk on sovereign defaults. We use the International Country 
Risk Index, the Polity IV, the rule of law and the economic freedom index. We find that these 
are all significant in explaining the probability of sovereign defaults. This is consistent with 
the results of Yu (2016) and Hatchondo et al. (2007) who also conclude that the political 
stability, as measured by higher level of democracy and freedom, together with consistent 
political regime lowers the probability of default.  
Another contribution of our research is that we incorporate in our analysis a new dataset of 
capital control restrictions on outflows constructed by Fernandez et al. (2015). This dataset 
includes an extended sample of countries, years and asset categories on both capital controls 
on inflows and outflows. We find evidence that the capital controls outflows index is positively 
associated with the sovereign defaults with the macroeconomic fundaments remaining 
statistically significant. This is in contrast with Moody’s Investor Services (2008) survey on 
Sovereign defaults and Interference, which finds that deposit freezes occurred outside of 
government defaults and therefore the relation between deposit controls with sovereign defaults 
is not perfect. Further work could explore in more depth the association between the capital 
control restrictions and the sovereign defaults. 




Table 2.10: Countries in the sample  
Countries 
Algeria Ethiopia Malaysia South Africa 
Angola Finland Malta Spain 
Argentina France Mauritius Sri Lanka 
Australia Georgia Mexico Swaziland 
Austria Germany Moldova Sweden 
Bahrain Ghana Morocco Switzerland 
Bangladesh Greece Myanmar Tanzania 
Belgium Guatemala Netherlands Thailand 
Bolivia Hong Kong SAR New Zealand Togo 
Brazil Hungary Nicaragua Tunisia 
Brunei Darussalam Iceland Nigeria Turkey 
Bulgaria India Norway Uganda 
Burkina Faso Indonesia Oman Ukraine 
Canada Islamic Republic of Iran Pakistan United Arab Emirates 
Chile Ireland Panama United Kingdom 
China Israel Paraguay United States 
Colombia Italy Peru Uruguay 
Costa Rica Jamaica Philippines Uzbekistan 
Cote d'Ivoire Japan Poland Venezuela 
Cyprus Kazakhstan Portugal Vietnam 
Czech Republic Kenya Qatar Zambia 
Denmark Korea Romania   
Dominican Republic Kuwait Russia   
Ecuador Kyrgyz Republic Saudi Arabia 
Egypt Latvia Singapore   









Table 2.11: Defaulted countries per year 
 
Countries '85 '86 '87 '88 '89 '90 '91 '92 '93 '94 '95 '96 '97 '98 '99 '00 '01 '02 '03 '04 '05 '06 '07 '08 '09 '10 '11 '12 '13 '14 '15 
Algeria           x x x x x x x x x                           x       
Angola         x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x   
Argentina x x x x x x x x x               x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
Bangladesh x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x   x x x x x x x x x x   
Bolivia x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x             
Brazil x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x     x       x x x x x x x     
Bulgaria         x x x x x x x x x x x x x x   x                       
Burkina 
Faso 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
  
Chile x x x x x x                                                   
Colombia x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x                         
Costa Rica x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x                 
Cote 
d'Ivoire 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
  
Cyprus                                                         x     
Dominican 
Republic 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x             
  
Ecuador x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x   
Egypt x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x             
El Salvador x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x                                 
Ethiopia x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x   
Georgia               x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x   
Ghana x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x   
Greece                                                       x x     
Guatemala x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x               x     
Hungary                                                 x             
India               x x                                             
Indonesia x x x x x x x x x x       x x x x x x x x                     




x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x                       x x x   
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Jamaica x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x   
Kazakhstan                 x x x     x x                                 
Kenya x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x   
Korea x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x   
Kuwait           x x                                                 
Kyrgyz 
Republic 
                x x x x x   x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
  
Lebanon x x x x x x x x x x x                                         
Mauritius       x   x x x x x x x                             x x x x   
Mexico x x x x x x                                                   
Moldova                 x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x   
Morocco x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x               
Myanmar x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x   
Nicaragua x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x   
Nigeria x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x               x x   
Pakistan         x x x x           x x   x                             
Panama x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x                             
Paraguay x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x   
Peru x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x           
Philippines x x x x x x x x   x       x x x x x x   x x x x               
Poland x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x                           
Portugal                                                         x     
Romania   x                     x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x   
Russia           x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x         
Slovenia               x x x x x                                       
South 
Africa 
x x x   x       x                                           
  
Sri Lanka       x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x     x               x x   
Swaziland   x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x   
Tanzania x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x   
Thailand                                               x x x x x       
Togo x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x   
Tunisia x x x   x x x x x x x                                   x     
Uganda x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x   
Ukraine               x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x   
Uruguay x x   x   x x                       x                         




Uzbekistan                           x x x x x x x x   x x x x x         
Venezuela x x x x x x   x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x   
Vietnam x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x     x   x           
Zambia x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x   
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We investigate the effect of IMF assistance on economic growth in a broad panel of countries. 
We argue that countries are likely self-select into seeking IMF involvement based on their 
economic performance. We control for such endogeneity by means of instrumental variables. 
Our findings indicate that the contemporaneous effect of the IMF involvement is insignificant 
while the lagged effect is positive. The 2SLS effect is larger than the OLS one, indicating that 
the latter is downward biased. 





The International Monetary Fund (IMF) was set up in 1944 with the aim to promote economic 
and monetary stability and foster economic growth around the world. Since then, the IMF 
provided financial assistance to numerous developing and developed countries, including, 
recently, a number of peripheral European countries such as Hungary, Greece and Portugal. 
The economic effects of IMF assistance have been the subject of an on-going and greatly 
controversial debate. The findings are rather disappointing: the research available so far 
suggests that the effect on growth has been insignificant and may even have been negative.  
In theory, the IMF intervention should improve economic growth both directly and indirectly, 
for a number of reasons. First, the IMF gives policy advice at the times of crises. Following 
that advice should help improve the economic climate and thus foster growth in the future. 
Second, IMF loans frequently have strict conditions attached to them, such as changing the 
execution of monetary policy or implementing fiscal austerity. The disbursement of IMF loans 
only takes place if the recipient country adheres to the conditions. Following IMF’s advice and 
accepting the conditionality should have similar effects: improved policy making, if credible, 
is seen by consumers as indicative of a lower tax burden and higher growth in the future, which 
leads them to increase their consumption, thus fuelling growth.5 Finally, the money that is 
disbursed helps relax financial constraints that the countries face and should stimulate their 
economies. In particular, as the recent EMU crisis illustrates rather well, in the absence of 
external financial assistance, crisis-stricken countries would face prohibitively high interest 
rates.  
The literature also highlights possible indirect channels: moral hazard (Vaubel 1983) and the 
Dutch Disease (Paldam, 1997; Doucouliagos and Paldam, 2009). The moral hazard argument 
rests on the fact that being able to apply for assistance from the IMF (and other similar 
institutions) is similar to insurance. This can give the countries in question incentive to engage 
in risky or unsound policies. The Dutch Disease hypothesis, in turn, points out that countries 
with large inflows of foreign currency may experience a pressure on their currency to 
appreciate, which in turn undermines the competitiveness of their manufacturing firms at 
                                                          
5 Giavazzi and Pagano (1990 and 1995) argue, for example, that fiscal austerity can stimulate growth 
in the short term. They argue that Denmark and Ireland in the 1980s both experienced improved 
growth performance immediately after fiscal reforms.  
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international markets. Hence, while the direct channels stipulate a positive effect of IMF 
assistance, the indirect channels are associated with a negative impact.  
An additional issue is that of endogeneity: the countries requesting assistance from the IMF 
may be already facing imminent economic difficulties at the time they submit their request. 
Alternatively, out of the countries that apply for financial aid from the IMF, those that receive 
support tend to be in worse economic situation that those that do not, or the former receive 
more substantial assistance. The negative or insignificant relationship between IMF assistance 
and economic growth therefore then can be due to such an endogeneity bias.  
Besides endogeneity, another problem with much of the past analytical literature on the IMF 
involvement and its effect is that it typically only considers how such involvement affects 
contemporaneous economic performance. If the IMF fosters growth, the positive effect of its 
assistance may appear only with a lag (Clemens et al., 2012, make a similar point about the 
effectiveness of developmental aid).  
In this paper, we revisit the effect of IMF loans while taking account of the aforementioned 
criticisms of the previous literature: endogeneity bias and the delay between IMF assistance 
and its economic effect. To account for endogeneity, we use instrumental variables. Finding 
suitable instruments, however, is difficult. In particular the instruments need to possess 
sufficient explanatory power when it comes to explaining the probability (or size) of IMF 
assistance without being themselves correlated with growth to allow the analyst to exclude 
them from the main (second-stage) regression equation. Variables indicative of the economic 
hardship, such as the countries’ indebtedness or interest rates that they are facing when 
borrowing, are good predictors of the probability that they will seek IMF assistance. However, 
the same economic hardship is likely to be responsible for the low economic growth that those 
countries experience at the time of seeing IMF help, or that they will be encountering in the 
near future. Therefore, we rely on non-economic instrumental variables. Specifically, we use 
the degree of democracy and the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) non-permanent 
membership. To account for the possibility that the effect of IFI assistance may not occur 
contemporaneously but with a delay, we allow the IMF loans to have a lagged effect on growth. 
In the following section, we briefly discuss the literature on the economic effects of IMF 
assistance. We present our data and methodology in Section 3.4 and the results in Section 3.5 
and Section 3.6 concludes.  





As mentioned in the introduction, the IMF’s purpose when founded was amongst other to 
promote economic growth and stability. It counts 189 country members from all over the world 
that work together towards that goal. Each of these countries is assigned a quota that is 
determined based on the country’s GDP, openness, international reserves and economic 
variability which are measured in Special Drawing Rights (SDRs). the IMF’s unit of account. 
The quotas are important as they determine the country’s access to financing, voting power and 
subscription (this determines the maximum amount of financial resources that a country must 
provide to the fund), with United States having the highest one and Tuvalu the lowest. The 
SDR is a supplementary international reserve asset that was created in order to account for 
every country’s official reserves. It is calculated as a basket of currencies that is reviewed every 
five years. 
One of its fundamental responsibilities as IMF claims on its website is the provision of loans 
to its members that are experiencing balance of payments problems. It is worth mentioning that 
it does not provide loans for specific projects unlike the World Bank. To receive a loan a 
country must submit a letter of intent where it describes its plan for economic recovery and 
how it will repay the loan. The executive board of the fund then examines the letter and agrees 
with the country on the terms and conditions. The process after the provision of the loan has 
been agreed, is simple and as follows. The amount of the loan is made available under one of 
the various lending instruments that IMF has in its disposal. These instruments determine both 
the arrangement under which the loan is provided and the rules that are attached to it. However, 
and most importantly under every instrument is defined the specific percentage of the quota up 
to which the country can borrow. The choice of the instrument is made based on what 
specifically the country needs to address the problem. There are five facilities under which 
non-concessional loans are provided. In cases of low income countries that borrow money 
under the Poverty Reduction and Growth Trust (PRGT) concessional loans are offered; i.e. no 
interest rates is charged until the end of a specified period.  
The five facilities are: the Stand-By Arrangements (SBA), Flexible Credit Line(FCL), 
Precautionary and Liquidity Line (PLL), Extended Fund Facility (EFF) and finally Rapid 
Financing Instrument (RFI). We will now briefly explain their characteristics and differences:  
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• SBA: Suitable for countries that face short term balance of payments problems. Its 
length is flexible but usually is between 1 to 2 years but no more than 3, with the 
repayment period ranging from 3.25 to 5 years. The amount of the loan can be up to 
145% of the. country’s quota for any one-year period and up to a cumulative 435% over 
the life of the program. Countries are monitored and have to reach certain pre-agreed 
goals. It is worth noting that the majority of non-concessional loans were given under 
SBA.  
• FCL: Loans under this program are only given to countries with strong policies and 
economic fundamentals as well as track records of policy implementation. Its length is 
either one or two years. If two years there is an interim review after the first year to 
ensure that the qualifications are still met. The repayment period is 3.25 to 5 years. 
Unlike SBA, there is no access limit and no conditional to implementation of a specific 
strategy. 
• PLL: It is addressed to countries that have sound economic fundamentals but do not 
meet the qualifications to receive a loan under FLL but at the same time do not need as 
many policy adjustments as the ones in SBA. The conditions attached to it are focused 
on “correcting” the country’s vulnerabilities. Its duration is from 0.5 to 2 years. If 0.5 
year then the amount that can be borrowed is up to 125% of the quota whereas longer 
programs have a limit of 250% with semi-annual reviews on the progress. Limits on 
both occasions can be doubled in very exceptional cases. 
• EFF: It is for countries that require important economic reforms to address medium or 
long-term balance of payments problems. It usually longer that a SBA and the 
repayment period is 4.5 to 10 years. Similar to the SBA the amount of the loan can be 
up to 145% of the. country’s quota for any one-year period and up to a cumulative 
435% over the life of the program. The increase of the loans provided under EFF the 
lately features the economic situation of recent years. 
• RFI: It is designed to offer quick financial assistance to countries that face an urgent 
balance of payments need. Its conditionality is limited and the country can borrow up 
to 37.5% of its quota annually and 75% cumulatively and the repayment period is 3.25 
to 5 years.  
 
Table 3.1 below depicts the loans that have been given by IMF under SBA from 2002 to 2009, 
measured in thousands of SDRs. 

















Stand-By Arrangements (SBA) 
Argentina September 20, 2003 September 19, 2006 8,981,000 6,910,000 10,687,165 
Belarus, 
Republic of 
January 12, 2009 April 11, 2010 1,618,118 1,100,320 517,798 
Bolivia April 02, 2003 April 01, 2004 214,390 48,230 166,160 
Bosnia and 
Herzegovina 
August 02, 2002 February 29, 2004 67,600 12,000 88,305 
Brazil September 06, 2002 March 31, 2005 19,765,429 10,175,482 19056479 
Bulgaria February 27, 2002 February 26, 2004 340,000 152,000 1,557,858 
Colombia January 15, 2003 January 14, 2005 1,548,000 1,548,000 0 
Croatia, 
Republic of 
February 03, 2003 April 02, 2004 202,880 202,880 0 
Dominican 
Republic 
August 29, 2003 August 28, 2005 1,313,400 980,660 524,278 
Ecuador March 21, 2003 April 20, 2004 151,000 90,600 251,712 
El Salvador January 16, 2009 March 31, 2010 513,900 513,900 0 
Gabon May 28, 2004 June 30, 2005 146,590 104,926 78,333 
Georgia September 15, 2008 March 14, 2010 477,100 315,400 161,700 
Guatemala June 18, 2003 March 15, 2004 84,000 84,000 0 
Honduras April 07, 2008 March 30, 2009 38,850 38,850 0 
Hungary November 06, 2008 April 05, 2010 10,537,500 6,322,500 4,215,000 
Iceland November 19, 2008 November 18, 2010 1,400,000 840,000 560,000 
Iraq December 23, 2005 March 22, 2007 950,720 950,720 297,100 
Jordan July 03, 2002 July 02, 2004 85,280 74,620 279,302 
Latvia, 
Republic of 





April 30, 2003 June 15, 2004 71,675 49,175 52,119 
Pakistan November 24, 2008 October 23, 2010 5,168,500 3,101,100 2,070,559 
Paraguay December 15, 2003 March 31, 2005 145,000 145,000 0 
Peru February 01, 2002 February 29, 2004 714,647 714,647 173,875 
Romania July 07, 2004 July 06, 2006 250,000 250,000 285,354 
Serbia, 
Republic of 
January 16, 2009 April 15, 2010 350,775 350,775 0 
Seychelles November 14, 2008 November 13, 2010 17,600 11,440 6,160 
Turkey February 04, 2002 December 31, 2004 38,966,480 7,854,557 41,167,249 
Ukraine March 29, 2004 March 28, 2005 11,411,600 8,411,600 4,076,610 
Uruguay April 01, 2002 March 31, 2005 3,859,400 792,200 3,338,950 
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Total 110,913,060 53,131,864 90,147,410 
 
Figure 3.1 below presents the amounts agreed under SBA the period 2002 to 2009 per 
continents. 
 
Figure 3.1: SBA amounts agreed per continent ‘02-‘09 
 
It is worth briefly discussing the PRGT which is tailored made to suit to the needs of low 
income countries. As mentioned above it is concessional lending and funds are obtained by 
bilateral loan agreements at the market rate. The PRGT has three facilities, the Extended Credit 
Facility (ECF), the Standby Credit Facility (SCF) and the Rapid Credit Facility (RCF).  
• ECF: It is a medium to long term engagement that is used to address protracted balance 
of payments problems.  
• SCF: It used for short term actual or potential balance of payments caused by external 
for domestic shocks or policy slippages 
• RCF: Unconditional single up-front payout for countries that are facing urgent balance 
of payment needs. 
Table 3.2 below depicts the loans that have been given by IMF under PRGT from 2000 to 2008, 


























Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility Trust 
Albania June 21, 2002 June 20, 2005 73,046 33,741 231,172 
Armenia, 
Republic of 
May 23, 2001 May 22, 2004 147,200 56,530 557,044 
Azerbaijan July 06, 2001 March 31, 2005 148,030 51,480 207,696 
Bangladesh June 20, 2003 June 19, 2006 1,547,990 767,980 780,010 
Benin July 17, 2000 March 31, 2004 61,050 14,670 69483 
Burkina Faso June 11, 2003 June 10, 2006 102,340 58,772 230,541 
Burundi January 23, 2004 January 22, 2007 323,400 194,700 198,000 
Cabo Verde April 10, 2002 April 09, 2005 17,280 6,210 11070 




June 12, 2002 June 11, 2005 1,740,000 186,399 1,553,601 
Cote d'Ivoire March 29, 2002 March 28, 2005 585,360 468,280 486,528 
Dominica December 29, 2003 December 28, 2006 23,064 12,366 10,698 
Ethiopia March 22, 2001 July 31, 2004 100,277 20,858 105,835 
Gambia, The July 18, 2002 July 17, 2005 68,440 48,660 52,757 
Ghana May 09, 2003 May 08, 2006 553,500 316,350 627,434 
Guinea May 02, 2001 May 01, 2004 182,070 125,001 173,706 
Guyana September 20, 2002 March 19, 2006 163,650 98,610 137,630 
Kenya November 21, 2003 November 20, 2006 850,000 600,000 404,637 
Kyrgyz 
Republic 




April 25, 2001 April 24, 2005 63,400 27,160 53,249 
Lesotho March 09, 2001 June 30, 2004 24,500 7,000 17,878 
Madagascar March 01, 2001 November 30, 2004 354,380 144,236 378,496 
Malawi December 21, 2000 December 20, 2004 211,670 110,004 213,793 
Mauritania July 18, 2003 July 17, 2006 54,740 30,610 91,115 
Mongolia September 28, 2001 July 31, 2005 56,980 32,560 61,854 
Nepal November 19, 2003 November 18, 2006 199,600 135,430 64,730 
Nicaragua December 13, 2002 December 12, 2005 442,000 246,570 442,698 
Niger December 22, 2000 June 30, 2004 167,770 49,800 265,314 
Pakistan December 06, 2001 December 05, 2004 1,033,700 344,560 944,721 
Rwanda August 12, 2002 August 11, 2005 36,030 17,769 138,923 
Senegal April 28, 2003 April 27, 2006 121,350 62,400 338,383 
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Sierra Leone September 26, 2001 September 25, 2004 365,410 121,006 320,557 
Sri Lanka April 18, 2003 April 17, 2006 807,000 691,830 120,770 
Tajikistan, 
Republic of 
December 11, 2002 December 10, 2005 195,000 78,400 174,594 
Tanzania August 16, 2003 August 15, 2006 78,400 36,400 580,602 
Uganda September 13, 2002 September 12, 2005 27,000 14,000 280,131 
Vietnam April 13, 2001 April 12, 2004 290,000 165,800 226,880 
Congo, 
Republic of 
December 06, 2004 December 05, 2007 228,420 156,471 101,088 
Georgia June 04, 2004 June 03, 2007 294,000 154,000 501,695 
Honduras February 27, 2004 February 26, 2007 213,600 111,890 166,392 
Mali June 23, 2004 June 22, 2007 55,980 24,681 128,545 
Mozambique July 06, 2004 July 05, 2007 34,080 16,260 139,160 
Zambia June 16, 2004 June 15, 2007 709,195 157,471 684,809 
Chad February 16, 2005 February 15, 2008 75,600 63,000 132,898 
Sao Tome & 
Principe 








December 22, 2006 December 21, 2009 116,955 43,400 98,667 
Grenada April 17, 2006 April 16, 2009 33,050 22,980 10,070 
Haiti November 20, 2006 November 19, 2009 237,510 106,430 131,080 
Moldova, 
Republic of 
May 05, 2006 May 04, 2009 332,640 136,110 256,590 
Djibouti September 17, 2008 September 16, 2011 12,720 8,856 11,259 
Liberia March 14, 2008 March 13, 2011 239,020 24,760 214,260 
Togo April 21, 2008 April 20, 2011 84,410 53,175 31,235 
Total 14,541,857 6,749,204 14,424,695 
 
 




Figure 3.2 below presents the amounts agreed under PRGT the period 2000 to 2008 per 
continents. 
Figure 3.2: PGRT amounts agreed per continent ‘00-‘08 
 
 
Suffice to say that IMF’s involvement has resulted in both successes and failures. Below we 
will briefly present two case studies; one that has been characterised as a success and one as 
failure. The former is the case of Turkey in 2001 and the latter the case of Russia in 1998.  
 
3.2.1 IMF Success Story 
 
Turkey has a long history with IMF as it has resorted to its funding 18 times since 1961 with 
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Figure 3.3: IMF agreements in Turkey Source: IMF 
 
 
The 2002 program is widely known as one of the fund’s greatest successes. It was a SBA 
agreement of 11,914 billion SDRs. The government passed 19 laws and regulations regarding 
structural reforms (Arpac and Bird 2009). Amongst these was independence of the Central 
bank, a change from price support to income support in the agricultural sector and regulations 
regarding the public procurement. During the program, the government has changed which 
usually has a negative impact on its implementation. Having said that though in this case it was 
different. The new government was determined to make it work thus continued the work of the 
previous government. The result was that inflation has fallen dramatically, GDP has increased 
and the debt to GDP ratio has decreased. In figure 3.4 we can see that GDP growth starts 










































Figure 3.4: GDP growth and inflation in Turkey '95-'05 Source: World Development 
Indicators 
 
3.2.2 IMF Failure Story 
 
Unlike Turkey, Russia has not resorted to IMF for help many times as it has been a member 
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Figure 3.5: IMF agreements in Russia Source: IMF 
 
 
Russia’s stock market in the period 1996 to 1997 has performed very well, however in the 
Asian crisis of 1997 has impacted it as many foreign investors started to withdraw their assets. 
This in combination with the oil price drop which is one of its major foreign currency earnings 
has resulted in the deterioration of its economy. Russia resulted to IMF for help. The reforms 
that had to be implemented were many and required a strong political will to ensure that the 
necessary changes will take place. The government was unable to implement the changes. The 
fund though at the same time, did not deny the provision of any of tranches of the loan even 
thought it was responsible for checking that requirements were met and were clearly not. In 


































Figure 3.6: GDP growth and inflation in Russia '93-'12 Source: World Development 
Indicators 
 
3.3. IMF and Economic Growth 
The reasons why a country enters into an agreement with a financial institution such as the IMF 
can vary. Governments may do so when they face pressures of a foreign reserve crisis or in an 
attempt to protect themselves from the political cost that adjustment policies may cause. In the 
latter case, the institution-lender plays the role of the “scapegoat” for austerity measures and 
essential economic reforms that usually are strict and unpleasant for the public (Przeworski and 
Vreeland 2000).   
The general finding of the existing literature is that receiving aid from the IMF and other 
international financial institutions does not stimulate economic growth of the recipient country. 
One of the first to examine the effect of IFIs on growth is Pastor (1987). He examines amongst 
other variables the effects of an IMF program in 18 Latin American countries on growth. The 
way he tries to test it is by comparing program and no-program countries as well as behaviour 
of the countries pre and post receiving IMF lending. He finds that there is no evidence to 
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methodology of before and after analysis as well, Evrensel (2002) supports that IMF programs 
provide a balance of payment alleviation but only in the short term.  In the after-program period 
these improvements are not sustained and in many cases the recipient countries re-enter the 
program in worse macroeconomic conditions compared to the first time they have entered.   
Butkiewicz and Yanikkaya (2005) approach differently than the rest the issue of IFI lending in 
their attempt to understand its effects on economic growth. Instead of using the existence of 
programs they use the value of Fund and Bank credits. Using an empirical growth model which 
includes various determinants of growth and applying different econometric techniques they 
find that Fund lending negatively effects growth. On the other hand, Bank credit is some cases 
of low income and poor democracy countries increases growth.  
Przeworski and Vreeland (2000) find that the country’s participation to the program has a 
negative effect on growth rates as long as countries remain under it. They observe also that as 
soon as they leave the program, their growth accelerates compared to the period under the 
program but they do not grow as fast as they would if they had never participated. Dreher 
(2006) argues that the reason behind the reduced growth rates of the recipient countries can be 
the self-selection into these programs. Przeworski and Vreeland seek to address this issue. They 
identify countries that face similar fiscal and monetary problems, foreign reserves crises or 
high domestic deficits, with some participating in an IMF program and others not. They find 
that those receiving IMF assistance grow by 2.35% less than the ones that do not, despite 
displaying similar economic conditions before participation.  
Barro and Lee (2003) attempt to address the issue of endogeneity of IMF programs. They argue 
that the IMF is a “bureaucratic and political organization” so that countries which have more 
influence in it have better chances to receive a loan, and that loan is likely to be larger compared 
to countries with less influence in the organization. Therefore, to deal with the endogeneity of 
the IMF loans, they use instrumental variables that reflect the recipient countries’ political and 
economic connections. These variables were political proximity to the US and major European 
countries, trade links with the US and Europe, which they combine with economic 
characteristics, such as reserves, lagged growth and GDP per capita. Dreher (2006) follows a 
similar approach, combining economic and political variables. Nevertheless, both papers’ 
results again indicate a significantly negative impact of the participation in an IMF program on 
the economic growth, with or without accounting for the potential endogeneity bias. A potential 
drawback of both analyses is that their instruments include economic indicators which are 




likely to be correlated with contemporaneous economic growth, the left-hand side variable in 
their second-stage regression. We discuss below how we seek to avoid this weakness.  
Dreher, Sturm and Vreeland (2009) examine the relationship between the temporary 
membership in the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) and the participation in an IMF 
program. They conclude that there is a strong and significant relationship between UNSC 
temporary membership and participation to the programs and that the UNSC membership 
translated into fewer conditions attached to the program. This suggest that IMF loans are 
potentially motivated by political considerations: countries serving on the UNSC enjoy 
disproportionate influence and the IMF (or its major shareholders) use IMF loans to secure the 
support of UNSC members. Thacker (1999) in his attempt to understand whether politics play 
a role on IMF lending uses as well the United Nations vote but in the General Assembly this 
time. Amongst various variables that includes in his model is the UN General Assembly 
(UNGA) vote. The variable is constructed to measure the degree of coincidence of the votes in 
the UNGA between the sample country and the US in 10 to 15 issues that the State Department 
has deemed as key votes. It ranges between 0 and 1. Evidence show that the UNGA vote affects 
IMF lending. More specifically, a 0.10 movement in the variable increases the log odds of 
getting a loan by 0.29. 
Another frequently raised argument is that the IMF in many instances uses its credit in order 
to support undemocratic regimes. For instance, Edwards and Santaella (1993), Bandow (1994) 
and Vreeland (2003) argue that the international financial institution use their loans to supports 
undemocratic regimes. Furthemore, Barro and Lee (2005) show that the participation in IMF 
loan programs might result in minor effects on the rule of law and democracy.  
A number of previous studies thus sought to account for the possible self-selection into IMF 
programs using instrumental variables. However, these generally tend to rely on using 
economic characteristics as instruments. We propose, instead, to use political and institutional 
characteristics, which are less likely to be correlated with the (observable or unobservable) 
economic performance of countries before they apply for IMF aid. As both Barro and Lee 
(2003) and Dreher, Sturm and Vreeland (2009) observe, political considerations are important 
predictors of participation to IMF loan programs. Important, such considerations should be 
largely orthogonal to the economic need for IMF assistance.  
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3.4. Data and Methodology 
Our data include 213 countries (see table 3.6 in Appendix 3.1) and 38 years (1971 to 2009). 
The panel is unbalanced since not all observations for all countries and years are available.  The 
data, apart from some exceptions mentioned below, were obtained from the World Bank World 
Development Indicators (WDI) Edition of April 2012.  
The analysis is based on estimating an augmented Solow model of growth (see Mankiw, Romer 
and Weil, 1992) (eq 3.1) 
 𝒴𝑖 = 𝛽𝑖 + 𝛽𝑔 𝑔𝑖 + 𝛽𝑓 𝑓𝑖 +  𝛽𝑝 𝑝𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖 (eq 3.1) 
where 𝒴𝑖 economic growth , 𝑔𝑖 gross fixed capita formation (GFCF) 𝑝𝑖  population growth , 𝑓𝑖 
IMF loan dummy 
The dependent variable is the growth rate of GDP per capita. We include population growth 
and investment (gross fixed capital formation to GDP ratio) as explanatory variables, alongside 
an IMF loan dummy, the principal explanatory variable. The IMF dummy is constructed so as 
to take the value of 1 in years during which the country received a loan and 0 otherwise. We 
consider 3 IMF programs: Stand-by Arrangements (SBA), Extended Fund Facility (EEF) and 
Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility Arrangement (PRGF). The differences lie in the length 
of the repayment period, interest rates and eligibility criteria as discussed earlier. The dummy 
takes the value of 1 if the program was in effect for at least 5 months in a particular year. The 
source of this dataset is the webpage of Axel Dreher and his 2006 paper. Descriptive statistics 
on all variables, including the instruments (see below) are reported in Table 3.5.  
Table 3.3: Descriptive statistics 
Variables Min Max Mean Std Dev 
GDP per capita growth rate -50.047 90.470 1.846 6.186 
Investment/GDP  -23.763 113.578 22.294 8.542 
Population Growth -44.408 17.738 1.739 1.671 
IMF Loans 0 1 0.222 0.416 
Democracy -10 10 0.781 7.453 
UNSC 0 1 0.059 0.235 
 
A plausible reason why the previous literature has found a negative effect of IMF loans on 
economic growth is the endogeneity of IMF assistance: countries seek IMF help, for the most 
part, when they already face economic problems or are about to face such problems in the very 




near future. Therefore, there may be reverse causality between the dummy variable for IMF 
involvement and the growth rate. To find good instruments, however, is invariably difficult. 
The instruments have to be uncorrelated with the error term; this can be tested by means of the 
Sargan statistic: insignificant result suggest that the instruments can be excluded from the main 
regression. Furthermore, we need to ensure that the instruments are not correlated with the 
economic hardship that the countries are experiencing at the time of applying for IMF 
assistance. Therefore, we focus on instruments that reflect institutional and/or political rather 
than economic conditions. We select democracy and the United Nations Security Council 
(UNSC) non-permanent membership (as for the latter, Dreher, Sturm and Vreeland, 2009, find 
the UNSC temporary membership to be a strong predictor of countries’ participation in IMF 
programs). The UNSC non-permanent membership takes the form of a dummy coded 1 when 
the country was a member and 0 when not.6 The data on democracy are obtained from the 
PolityIV site. The variable takes values between -10 and 10, with the extreme values indicating 
autocracy and consolidated democracy, respectively. The model that we run is the second stage 
OLS , with eq 3.2 being our first stage OLS and our main regression and eq 3.3 being the 
second stage the IMF dummy against the chose instruments is estimated.  
  𝒴𝑖 = 𝛽𝑖 + 𝛽𝑔 𝑔𝑖 + 𝛽𝑓 𝑓𝑖 +  𝛽𝑝 𝑝𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖 (eq 3.2) 
   𝑓𝑖 = 𝛽𝑖 + 𝛽𝑑 𝑑𝑖 + 𝛽𝑢 𝑢𝑖 + 𝑢𝑖 (eq 3.3) 
where 𝒴𝑖 economic growth , 𝑔𝑖 gross fixed capita formation (GFCF) 𝑝𝑖  population growth , 𝑓𝑖 
IMF loan dummy, 𝑑𝑖  democracy as in polity IV 𝑢𝑖 UN Security Council temporary 
membership  
Finally, loans disbursed in one year may affect the economy in that year or in the subsequent 
year or years (see Clemens et al., 2012). The effect may be delayed for a number of reasons. 
Some loans may be allocated relatively late in the year and therefore cannot have much effect 
on that year’s economic outcomes. Furthermore, it may take a while for the effect of such loans 
(and/or the attached conditions) to work its way through the economy. In particular, it is 
possible for the loans and especially for the attached conditions to be associated with a J-curved 
effect: the immediate effect is negative, because of the austerity measures required, but the 
economy rebounds successfully, as the loans and the reforms start having a positive impact on 
                                                          
6 We are grateful to Axel Dreher for making the data available on his webpage.  
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growth. To explore this possibility, we include the IMF dummy in our regressions 
contemporaneously as well as lagged by up to three years.  
3.5. Results 
Table 3.3 reports the OLS results. The first column presents the results with the IMF variable 
entering the regression contemporaneously: this regression confirms the general result 
suggesting that the effect of IMF assistance on economic growth is insignificant.  The other 
two explanatory variables are significant at the 1% level, with the investment having a positive 
effect whereas that of the population growth negative. To examine how the growth rate behaves 
over time in relation to the IMF aid, we lag the IMF program dummy by between one and three 
years (columns 2-4). Doing so results in a striking change in the results: the dummy is 
significant at the 1 percent level in all three cases. Nevertheless, the effect seems low: 
participation in an IMF program increases the average annual growth by between 0.68 and 0.82 
percent. The effects of the other two explanatory variables remain unchanged.  
Table 3.4: OLS Results  
GDP per capita growth rate (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Investment 0.1607 0.1614 0.1583 0.1631 
 
(12.75)*** (12.65)*** (12.29)*** (12.58)*** 
Population Growth -0.5626 -0.569 -0.5821 -0.6007 
 
(-6.07)*** (-6.07)*** (-6.18)*** (-6.35)*** 
IMF Loans 0.1552 0.6844 0.7056 0.8172 
 
(0.76) (3.30)*** (3.37)*** (3.87)*** 
R2 0.0591 0.0592 0.0588 0.0599 
Lag of IMF Loans 0 1 2 3 
Number of countries  183 183 183 183 
Number of observations  5498 5410 5321 5231 
Method of estimation OLS OLS OLS OLS 
Notes: Absolute values of t statistics are shown in parentheses. Significance: * 10%; ** 5%; *** 1%. 
As we argue above, the OLS results may be biased due to endogeneity of IMF assistance. If 
this is the case, the growth rate may be falling independently of the IMF program participation. 
To remedy this, we apply the instrumental variables discussed in the preceding section: 
democracy (PolityIV score) and UNSC temporary membership. We report the 2SLS results in 




Table 3.4, again for the contemporaneous effect as well as with the IMF dummy lagged by up 
to three years. The first-stage F-statistic is always over 10, indicating that our two instruments 
explain the variation in IMF program participation rather well. In particular, democracy is 
positively correlated with the probability of participating in an IMF program, although the 
UNSC membership, contrary to expectations, turns out insignificant. The Sargan statistic is 
insignificant with the exception of the regression with the 2nd lag of IMF aid: given that our 
instruments pass this hurdle in three cases out of four, we feel fairly confident that our 
instruments are valid. The IMF effect, when examined contemporaneously, is again 
insignificant. When we lag the IMF dummy, it always turns out positive and significant. 
Moreover, the magnitude of the effect is increased considerably compared with the OLS 
results, indicating that the OLS indeed yields downward-biased estimates. The size of the effect 
rises as more lags are used and the effect of IMF program participation appears sizeable: growth 
improves, on average, by between 4 and 7 percent per year. After correcting for the endogeneity 
bias and allowing for a lagged effect of IMF loans, we see that participation in IMF programs 
indeed has a positive, and powerful, effect on economic growth.  
Table 3.5: 2SLS Results 
GDP per capita growth rate (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Investment 0.1707 0.1624 0.1484 0.1544 
 
(11.72)*** (11.02)*** (9.84)*** (9.95)*** 
Population Growth -0.5208 -0.4778 -0.3910 -0.3396 
 
(-5.03)** (-4.57) (-3.65) (-2.97) 
IMF Loans 3.4548 4.0134 5.7628 6.9738 
 
(1.61) (2.20)*** (3.47)*** (4.29)*** 
Sargan Statistic (p-value) 0.292 (0.59) 0.284 (0.59) 5.007 (0.02) 0.486 (0.49) 
F-statistic 1st stage 11.57 16.10 20.11 23.59 
Lag of IMF Loans 0 1 2 3 
Number of countries  104 104 104 104 
Number of observations  4484 4388 4290 4190 
Method of estimation 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 
Notes: Absolute values of t statistics are shown in parentheses. Significance: * 10%; ** 5%; *** 1%. 
The excluded instruments are democracy (Polity IV score) and UN security-council temporary 
membership.  
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As Table 3.5 shows, our data include observations of extremely low and high growth rates. 
These pertain mainly to countries affected by war (low growth) or recovering from a war (high 
growth). To make sure that our results are not affected by such potential outliers, we replicate 
the 2SLS analysis without observations for which the growth rate is outside the [-10,10] range. 
This leads to dropping 186 observations with growth rates below -10 percent and 2173 
observations with growth above 10 percent. The 2SLS results, nevertheless, are qualitatively 
similar to those in Table 3.3. The main difference is slightly lower magnitude of the coefficients 
estimated for the IMF effect, ranging from 2.42 for the contemporaneous effect (which is 
significant at the 10 percent level) to 5.21 for the 3rd lag. These results are available upon 
request.  




3.6. Conclusions  
International financial institutions, such as the IMF and the World Bank, disburse sizeable sums 
of money to countries in need. Yet, the empirical evidence on the effectiveness of that 
assistance, in terms of fostering economic growth or investment, is disappointing. As the recent 
overview studies by Doucouliagos and Paldam (2008, 2009) demonstrate, the effect of aid on 
growth is at best zero. The performance sheet of the IMF is particularly bad, with several 
studies reviewed in Section 3.3 of this paper concluding that countries that receive assistance 
from the IMF do significantly worse than those who do not.  
In this paper, we take a second look at the impact of IMF aid on economic growth. We argue 
that the insignificant or negative results found by the other studies can be due to two facts: (1) 
the effect of IMF assistance arrives with a lag rather than immediately, and (2) countries self-
select to request IMF assistance, so that the relationship between IMF involvement and 
economic growth is likely to be subject to endogeneity bias. We therefore allow IMF assistance 
to affect growth not only contemporaneously but also with a lag of up to three years, and use 
instrumental variables to remove the endogeneity bias. Moreover, we select instruments that 
are of political rather than economic nature – democracy index and temporary membership of 
the UN Security Council – to minimize the possibility that the instruments reflect the countries’ 
economic conditions.  
The results (figure 3.7) of our analysis paint a generally more positive picture than the previous 
literature. We find that allowing for IMF assistance to affect growth with a lag is enough to 
obtain a positive impact on growth, even when using only OLS. Moreover, the longer the lag, 
the greater is the size of the positive effect. Accounting for the likely endogeneity of IMF 
assistance, furthermore, increases the size of the estimated effect. With these two 
methodological modifications, we find that receiving IMF assistance increases the annual 







Figure 3.7: Summary of findings 
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Cambodia Iceland New Caledonia Tunisia 
Cameroon India New Zealand Turkey 
Canada Indonesia Nicaragua Turkmenistan 
Cape Verde Iran, Islamic Rep. Nigeria 
Turks and Caicos 
Islands 
Cayman Islands Iraq Niger Tuvalu 




Chad Isle of Man Norway Ukraine 
Channel Islands Israel Oman 
United Arab 
Emirates 
Chile Italy Pakistan United Kingdom 
China Jamaica Palau United States 





Congo, Dem. Rep. Kazakhstan Paraguay Vanuatu 
Congo, Rep. Kenya Peru Venezuela, RB 
Costa Rica Kiribati Philippines Vietnam 
Cote d'Ivoire Korea, Dem. Rep. Poland Virgin Islands (U.S.) 
Croatia Korea, Rep. Portugal West Bank and Gaza 
Cuba Kosovo Puerto Rico Yemen, Rep. 
Cyprus Kuwait Qatar Zambia 
Czech Republic Kyrgyz Republic Romania Zimbabwe 
Denmark Lao PDR Russian Federation 
Djibouti Latvia Rwanda   
















This paper aims to investigate the effect of various socioeconomic variables on suicide rates in 
Europe. We also examine the long and short-term dynamics of suicides by means of panel 
cointegration analysis. In an attempt to understand better the behaviours associated with 
suicides, we split the data according to geography and sex. The empirical results indicate that 
IMF intervention, abortions and unemployment positively affect suicides whereas alcohol 
consumption and the level of democracy influence them negatively. On the other hand, the 
growth rate of GDP per capita has no effect. However, when performing the panel cointegration 
analysis it seems that a short run causal effect exists. The only other variable that exhibits short-
term effect is alcohol consumption. Finally, the results of the various samples vary. 




The effects of the global financial crisis of 2008-2009 are still visible on European continent. 
Almost all European countries have been affected during the past eight years and some are still 
struggling with economic problems.  Needless to say, the crisis has also brought to the surface 
other problems such as the deterioration of public finance variables that have remained ignored 
or well-hidden until 2008. To deal with excessive debt, some of the countries turned to the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) for help, which, in Europe, cooperated closely with the 
European Central Bank (ECB) and the European Commission.  
The proposed solution to escalating public debt on the European fringe rested on 
implementation of strict austerity measures. This policy has been much debated and criticized. 
The main criticism is that this policy has not delivered the desired results. Unfortunately, 
unemployment has remained high and sustained economic growth has not been achieved in the 
crisis-stricken countries such as Greece and Spain. It was even argued that there has been an 
unusually high number of suicides in some European countries, and that this was attributable 
to the austerity measures and the IMF involvement.  In this paper we will try to shed light on 
this claim. To this effect, we analyse the determinants of suicide rates in 35 European countries 
European countries during the period 1985-2011 with the objective to identify the relationship 
between economic outcomes and suicides, if any (Map 4.1).   




Map 4.1: Suicide Rates in Europe 
Our aim is to investigate suicides from both the economic and sociological perspective. What 
factors can lead people to commit suicide and what can affect someone’s decision whether to 
commit suicide or not? The variables chosen were carefully selected based on the relevant 
existing literature. Our focus is on 35 European countries, selected according to data 
availability.  The sample was also split geographically into subsamples: Northern versus 
Southern Europe and Eastern versus Western Europe, and according to gender, males versus 
females. This will provide a general view on the factors that drive suicides, including 
geographical and gender-specific differences.  
The main methodology used is OLS, in the main sample and the subsamples. In an attempt, to 
test the robustness of our results, we have applied also another methodology, the panel 
cointegration model. These help us investigate not only the relationship between the 
independent and the dependent variable, but also the dynamics of their relationship. This means 
that we will understand both the long term and short term effects of the chosen variables on 
suicides. 
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4.2. Literature Review 
4.2.1 Economics of Suicides 
Suicides are a phenomenon that has been widely studied since at least 1897 when Emile 
Durkheim firstly published his book “Le suicide”, considered as the first attempt to 
methodologically study them. Following Durkheim, many researchers tried to identify the 
relationship of this phenomenon with other variables, mainly sociological ones. Some of them 
were abortions, alcohol and drug abuse as well as mental disorders (Mota et al. (2010), Lester 
(2005)). 
In spite of the fact that suicides are considered to be a subject of social sciences, some 
researchers look into them also from the economic perspective. Variables such as 
unemployment, GDP per capita and real income growth along with the other sociological were 
propose to explain suicides in more thorough way (Jungeilges and Kirchgässner (2002), Noh 
(2009)). 
Durkheim studied the topic of suicide using sociological methods applied in the context of 
society in 1897 in his book called “Suicide”. Durkheim was the first to argue that suicides are 
not a result of individual characteristics and personalities but can be also attributed to social 
factors. He claims that economic growth characterised by industrialisation results in higher 
level of social anomie: a personal state of anxiety and isolation that stems from an absence of 
social control and regulation, which leads to an increase of suicides.  Simpson and Gonklin 
(1989) support Durkheim. They find that there is a strong positive correlation between suicide 
rate and industrialisation using data from 71 nations worldwide.  In line with the above, Lester 
(1996) and Unnithan et al (1994) that economic development increases the rate of suicides.  
Another seminal contribution in the field of suicide is Hamermesh and Soss (1974) with their 
“theory of suicide”. Their “innovation” lies in the fact that they connected a social phenomenon 
– suicide- with the economic theory. According to them, the decision of an individual to 
commit suicide depends on the expected life utility. When this falls below a certain threshold, 
the individual decides to commit suicide. For example, they argue that higher income gives 
higher expected utility which results in a lower probability of committing suicide.  To test it 
they used three different datasets: data by age in different developed countries, a 20-year time 
series (1947-1967) by age group in the United States and lastly a cross section by state and age 
group in 1960. Their results indicate that after 1945, mild cyclical decreases in the economy 




resulted in the same proportionate increases in suicides as stronger cyclical fluctuations before 
1945. Another result that came out from both time-series and cross section analysis is that older 
people are affected more adversely by unemployment compared to younger people.  
4.2.2 Combining Social and Economic Variables 
There is a vast literature, which examines suicide using economic variables alone or combined 
with some sociological ones. Jungeilges and Kirchgässner (2002) attempted to investigate the 
way suicide rates are related to real income growth, real income per capita and civil liberty. 
The two economic variables were found to have a positive and significant impact on the 
dependent variable: the higher the economic growth and/or the higher real income the higher 
the suicide rate. Nevertheless, the significance of these effects varies depending on age. To be 
more specific, middle aged people and older women are affected more by income. At the same 
time, older people are more affected by income growth. On the other hand, liberty has a 
negative significant effect on suicides- the higher the liberty the lower the suicide rate.  
Another important economic variable whose effect has been studied is unemployment. argue 
that high unemployment rates will lead to high suicide rates. Noh (2009) tests how real GDP 
per capita variations affect the relationship between unemployment and suicide. The study 
extends from 1980 until 2002 and covers 24 OECD countries. The intuition behind this paper 
is that in a country where low income is the norm and people are poor; the shame associated 
with losing a job is less than the shame that one would get if he would lose a job in a society 
where everyone works. He finds that countries with higher income display a positive effect of 
unemployment on suicide rates and the opposite happens in countries with lower income. Apart 
from the effect of real GDP and unemployment, Noh (2009) examined other variables as well, 
for example alcohol consumption that has a positive significant impact. Furthermore, it is also 
interesting that there is a very strong link between the proportion of old people and suicide 
rates.  
Schminke and Studnicka (2011) test the way that both economic and sociological variables 
affect growth. The period that they examined is from 1993 to 2009 in a sample of 32 European 
countries. They argue that countries with lower GDP per capita and higher unemployment tend 
to have higher suicide rates whereas religion has a negative effect on suicides. Nevertheless, 
they did not seem to find any indication that economic deterioration in a country affects suicide 
rates in any way as the GDP growth was insignificant. Religion and the divorce rate both have 
a significant negative impact on the suicide rate. It should be noted that the two variables – 
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religion and divorce – are usually connected. More religious societies tend to have lower 
divorce rates. 
Andres (2006) decided to approach suicide rates differently. He split his sample into males and 
females and into various age groups. This paper examines 15 European countries over a 28-
year period extending from 1970 to 1998. Various variables were estimated; both economic 
and sociological ones: real GDP per capita, economic growth, Gini coefficient, unemployment, 
divorce and fertility rate, female labour participation and alcohol consumption. For the 
regression analysis fixed effects were used in the panel data. Striking enough is the result that 
GDP per capita and unemployment were found to be insignificant in contrast with the papers 
discussed above. Divorce rates and female labour participation rate do not seem to affect the 
suicide rates either. On the other hand, economic growth and fertility rate significantly 
negatively affect the dependent variable whereas alcohol consumption has a positive significant 
impact. He reports also that the Gini coefficient, although positive, is not significant. He 
highlights that the latter should be treated with caution because according to Gravelle et al. 
(2002) the reason for the Gini coefficient inconsistent findings is the poor quality of aggregate 
data. A final outcome of this paper is that socioeconomic predictors have different effects on 
different age groups. Some variables significantly affect younger people and others older 
people; for example fertility rate has a significant negative impact on males aged 45 to 64 but 
not in other age groups. 
Research on suicide rates has also been conducted in specific countries. Zhang et al. (2010), 
focused on China and more specifically on Shandong Province, the second largest province in 
that country, in a period extending from 1982 to 2005. Their aim is to define the trend of suicide 
rates and detect the various socioeconomic variables that shape this tendency. To begin with, 
the sample considered was divided according to gender and urban vs rural areas. This resulted 
in six samples: urban male, female and both and the same for the rural regions. It is worthwhile 
mentioning that the chosen province has 45% of rural population and 55% of urban and is 
considered to be representative of China as a whole in terms of structure, cultural and social 
life. As independent variables, they used the GDP per capita, rural and urban income both as 
an average and adjusted for inflation. The data were analysed by regression models with 
ARMA errors. Their results contrary to other studies indicate that economic growth negatively 
affects suicide rates. Increases in both rural and urban income decrease suicide rates. Finally, 
they find that as soon as economic growth reaches a steady state then suicide rates also reach a 
steady state with no ups and down. 




Chang et al. (2009) focus on suicide rates and their behaviour in Asia; particularly in Japan, 
Hong Kong, South Korea, Taiwan, Singapore and Thailand. The trigger for this paper was the 
Asian financial crisis in 1997, which started in Thailand and spread very fast to the other South 
East Asian countries.  The years examined extended from 1985 to 2006 and the data were 
obtained from the World Health Organisation and the Taiwanese mortality statistics. The 
authors believe that including a period of 12 years before crisis allows them to observe the 
suicide trends in these societies and separate the effects of the economic downturn from already 
existing trends. The analysis was made age and sex specific; where the age groups were 
specified according to whether and how long they were in the workforce. The groups are the 
following: people who entered the labour market recently (15- 34 years old), people that have 
been working longer (35 to 64 years old), and lastly the retired ones, (65 years old and above). 
They test the effect of GDP per capita, GDP growth, unemployment, divorce rates and marriage 
rates Their results indicate that suicide rates were higher during the crisis in Korea, Hong Kong 
and Japan but not in Taiwan and Singapore where the crisis had a smaller impact on 
unemployment and GDP. More specifically, male suicide rates were more affected by an 
increase in unemployment. This effect is more visible in Hong Kong and Korea. At the same 
time marriage and divorce did not seem to affect the dependent variable.  
4.2.3 Sociological Variables Only and Suicides  
As already mentioned above, the majority of studies in the suicide literature account for both 
economic and sociologic variables. Having discussed for the impact of various economic 
variables the next step is to move on to the sociological ones. Gruenewald et al. (1995), 
focusing on the states of USA, examine the relationship between suicides and alcohol 
consumption measured as alcohol sales, over a period of 20 years, 1969 to 1989. The results 
imply that suicide rates were connected to the sale of spirits, the age structure of the state, per 
capita land area, unemployment and finally religious preferences. Focusing solely on alcohol 
consumption, it has been observed that suicide rates were significantly and positively correlated 
with the sale of spirits and but not with wine or beer. Another variable that affects suicides 
positively is the rate of unemployment; on the other hand, religion, and more specifically 
Baptism and Mormonism have a negative impact on suicide rates.   
Stack and Wasserman (1993) argue that previous research has not made clear the effect of 
marital status on suicides and at the same time they highlight the way that alcohol consumption 
has been neglected in the research. Therefore, they evaluate the above linkages. Their 
dependent variable is the death by suicide (binary variable). The sample consists of 10,906 
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deaths based on the 1986 National Mortality Followback survey. This gives them 306 
observations with suicide the cause of death and 10,600 with the cause of death reported as 
‘other’. Their findings support the previous literature that low marital integration affects suicide 
rates but at the same time they find that alcohol consumption has a positive direct effect on the 
dependent variable. Finally, they argue that some of the low marital integration impact on 
suicide is via its association with heavy alcohol consumption. 
4.2.4 Alcohol Consumption and Suicides 
Lester (1995) also examines, amongst other things, the relation between alcohol consumption 
and suicide. He used data that measure alcohol consumption per capita per year in litres, 
acquiring the data from the Finnish Foundation for Alcohol studies, the World Health 
Organization (WHO) as well as the official statistics of some nations. The time span of the data 
extends from 1950 to 1972 and the dependent variable is measured as suicides per 100,000 
living people per year. Another independent variable was the divorce rate aiming at explaining 
the effect of alcohol on suicide rates above and beyond divorce. After running a regression 
analyses and a simple Pearson correlation, Lester found that both independent variables affect 
positively suicide rates in 9 out of 13 nations examined. 
Nemtsov (2003) restricted his research to Russia choosing his sample to be from 1981 until 
1993 taking into account the anti-alcohol campaign of 1985-1991 and the market reforms of 
1992. The dependent variable is the suicide rates counted as per 100000 of the population, and 
it is related to alcohol consumption estimates and data on alcohol poisoning. The results 
indicate that alcohol consumption has a significant positive effect on suicide rates. More 
specifically, a decrease in alcohol consumption by 3.7% in the years 1985-1987, as an outcome 
of the anti-alcohol campaign, led in a decline in suicides. The anti-alcohol campaign was 
abandoned after 1987. However, the suicide rates increased only with a lag. The author 
attributes the lag to the fact that in order to reach the stage of committing suicide, 1 or even 2 
years of massive drinking precedes.  
Powell et al. (2001) look into the subject from a different angle compared to the rest. They have 
tried to explore the connection between alcohol consumption and nearly lethal suicide attempts. 
Alcohol consumption is counted in different forms:  binge drinking, frequency as well as 
quantity of drinking, alcohol consumption, and drinking within 3 hours of the suicide attempt. 
A case-control study was conducted on humans between 13 to 43 years old. The findings of bi-
variate analysis show that all the above variables are associated with the dependent variable. 




All variables apart from the age at which began drinking exhibited a J-shaped relationship 
between alcohol exposure and nearly lethal suicide attempts. Having controlled for potential 
confounders and other measures of alcohol exposure, they find that drinking within 3 hours of 
attempt remained most strongly associated with the outcome. Finally, alcoholism remained 
significantly associated in most models, but at lower strength.  
4.2.5 Abortions 
Another variable that has attracted the interest of researchers is abortions. Often its effect is 
associated with deliberate self-harm and suicides. Morgan et al. (1997) have linked admissions 
for induced abortion, miscarriage and normal delivery to suicide attempts in a five-year sample 
period. Their findings suggest that induced abortion can cause mental health deterioration 
however it is unlikely that abortions lead to suicides.  
Mota et.al (2010) focusing on United States conducted research with 3000 women who have 
undergone abortion. Having controlled for various sociodemographic characteristics, they 
concluded that abortions are strongly related to mental disorders. The disorders range from 
mood disorders and anxiety disorders to suicidal ideation and attempts. The increased risk for 
the latter reaches 59%. Gissler et al. (2005) examined 13-year data on pregnancy associated 
deaths in Finland. The research was based on data that were obtained from three different 
national health sources where information on death were recorded.  Amongst their findings 
they noted that an increased risk of suicide was observed after abortions specifically in women 
between 15-24 years. 
Thorp et al. (2005) conducted an analysis on abortion and its physical and psychological 
consequences based on papers written between 1966 and 2002 that used over 100 women as 
sample and a minimum of 2 months follow-up after.  The outcome of their extensive research 
is that abortions both induced and elective substantially increase risks for mood disorders that 
can lead to self-harm attempts. It should also be noted that latest cohort studies, in contrast to 
earlier studies, connect abortions to deliberate self-harm, suicide and psychiatric admission.  
Coleman (2011), using as well meta-analysis, has tried to identify the link of abortions with 
mental health based on 22 studies that meet selection criteria, such as minimum sample size of 
100, and at the same time minimize bias.  The conclusions drawn were that abortion increases 
the risk of developing psychological problems following the procedure by 81%, from which a 
10% is directly attributed to the procedure. Finally, the results indicated that in comparison to 
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women who delivered normally, women that had abortion exhibited higher frequency of 
suicidal behaviour and substance abuse.    
4.3. Data and Methodology 
The analysis covers 34 European countries based on data availability over the period 1985 to 
2011 obtained from the World Health Organisation (WHO). Descriptive statistics on suicide 
rates per country are presented in Table 4.1 in Appendix 4.1. We relate the suicide rates to a 
number of socioeconomic variables. The first is the GDP growth rate, a widely accepted 
indicator of the economic situation and welfare of a country. We also include the 
unemployment rate, another economic variable that is believed to affect suicides. We obtained 
data for both from the World Bank World Development Indicators (WDI) Edition of April 
2012. Below we have plotted growth and unemployment rates on the map of Europe (Map 4.2 
and 4.3). 
Map 4.2: GDP per capita in Europe 
 




Map 4.3: Unemployment rate in Europe 
 
The last variable that we examine is the IMF involvement as a dummy variable with 1 
indicating the years when the country received an IMF loan and 0 otherwise. To be more 
specific, the following 3 “facilities” are included in this variable, the Stand-By Arrangements 
(SBA), the Extended Fund Facility (EEF) and the Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility 
Arrangement (PRGF). The main differences lie in the length of the repayment period, the 
interest rates and the eligibility criteria. The dummy takes the value of 1 if the program was in 
effect for at least 5 months in a particular year. The source of this dataset is the webpage of 
Axel Dreher and his 2006 paper.  
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Figure 4.1: Evolution of the main variables 
 
As we are dealing with a phenomenon that is mostly a subject of study of sociology, the 
decision was made to include some social variables to examine their effect as well. These 
variables include alcohol consumption counted as litres per capita; this is available as the total 
consumption and broken down into spirits, beer and wine (litres per capita); and the number of 
abortions per 1000 live births. These were retrieved from the Eurostat and the World Health 
Organisation (WHO), respectively. In Figures 4.1 and 4.2 the evolution of these variables years 
the alcohol consumption over the years respectively are represented. Finally, we also include 
an institutional variable, the level of democracy. Data on the latter were obtained from the 
PolityIV project site. The variable takes values between -10 to +10, ranging from autocracies 
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Figure 4.2: Alcohol consumption (litres per capita) per year 
 
4.3.1 Methodology 
4.3.1.1 Ordinary Least Squares (OLS)   
As a first step, we run a standard OLS regression analysis to assess the effects of the 
explanatory variables described in the previous section on our dependent variable, the suicide 
rate per 100,000 of population.  Bearing in mind that we deal with panel data, the first questions 
that arises is whether we should apply fixed or random effects. The main difference lies in the 
way the relationship between predictor and outcome variables is treated. In the fixed effects 
(FE) model it is assumed that each group has a different intercept in the regression equation 
whilst in the random effects (RE) model it is assumed that each group has different disturbance.  
To determine the method to be used, we run the Hausman test. Its null hypothesis (H0) is that 
the unobserved effect is uncorrelated with the explanatory variable; so that RE is consistent. 
Running the test, we fail to reject the H0 as the p-value= 0.8149 therefore the RE method was 














Alcohol consumption Spirits (lt per capita)
Wine (lt per capita) Beers (lt per capita)
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test, the Breusch-Pagan Lagrange multiplier (LM). In this case the H0 hypothesis is that 
variances across entities is equal to zero, indicating that there is no significant difference across 
units.  The LM test results gives a p-value less than 0.05 we reject H0 affirming the decision 
that RE is the most suitable method (Table 4.6).  The equation that will be estimated  is below 
(eq 4.1) 
 𝒴𝑖 = 𝛽𝑖 + 𝛽𝑔 𝑔𝑖 + 𝛽𝑎 𝑎𝑖 + 𝛽𝑧𝑧𝑖 + 𝛽𝑢 𝑢𝑖 + 𝛽𝑝 𝑝𝑖 + 𝛽𝑓 𝑓𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖 (eq 4.1) 
where 𝒴𝑖 rate of suicides ,𝑔𝑖 GDP per capita, 𝑎𝑖 abortions per 1000 live births,  𝑧𝑖 alcohol 
consumption as litre per capita, 𝑝𝑖  democracy as in polity IV, 𝑢𝑖 unemployment rate,  𝑓𝑖 IMF 
loan dummy variables 
To examine in depth what factors affect suicide rates in Europe, we divide the sample into two 
categories of subsamples. The first division is according to geography with the division being 
based on United Nations statistics division and the CIA World Factbook. This resulted in the 
two sets of sub-samples being Northern versus Southern and Eastern versus Western European 
countries. It should be noted that countries in the same geographic region exhibit similar 
characteristics. For example, Southern countries have a family oriented culture, similar 
weather, lower GDP per capita and were hit harder by the economic crises compared to the 
Northern European countries. Table 4.7 presents the country sub-samples. The other division 
is by gender: the dataset on suicide rates has information on the percentage of the suicides that 
were committed by males and females (Figure 4.3). For all the categories in the subsamples 














Figure 4.3: Total suicide rates per year 
 
This allowed us to calculate the suicide rates for women and men separately. For each sub-
sample, we will run two regressions aiming in getting a clear idea on how suicide rates are 
affected. The first one will have all the variables as mentioned above- dropping of course 
abortions for the male sub-sample. In the second regression, the alcohol consumption will be 
substituted with its subcomponents: wine, spirits and beer consumption per capita ((eq 4.2), 
(eq 4.3),(eq 4.4), (eq 4.5)). 
 𝒴𝑖 = 𝛽𝑖 + 𝛽𝑔 𝑔𝑖 + 𝛽𝑎 𝑎𝑖 + 𝛽𝑢 𝑢𝑖 + 𝛽𝑝 𝑝𝑖 + 𝛽𝑓 𝑓𝑖 + 𝛽𝑤𝑤𝑖 + 𝛽𝑠𝑠𝑖 + 𝛽𝑣 𝑣𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖  (eq 4.2) 
  𝒴𝑖 = 𝛽𝑖 + 𝛽𝑔 𝑔𝑖 + 𝛽𝑎 𝑎𝑖 + 𝛽𝑢 𝑢𝑖 + 𝛽𝑝 𝑝𝑖 + 𝛽𝑓 𝑓𝑖 + 𝛽𝑤𝑤𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖 (eq 4.3) 
  𝒴𝑖 = 𝛽𝑖 + 𝛽𝑔 𝑔𝑖 + 𝛽𝑎 𝑎𝑖 + 𝛽𝑢 𝑢𝑖 + 𝛽𝑝 𝑝𝑖 + 𝛽𝑓 𝑓𝑖 + 𝛽𝑠𝑠𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖 (eq 4.4) 
  𝒴𝑖 = 𝛽𝑖 + 𝛽𝑔 𝑔𝑖 + 𝛽𝑎 𝑎𝑖 + 𝛽𝑢 𝑢𝑖 + 𝛽𝑝 𝑝𝑖 + 𝛽𝑓 𝑓𝑖 + 𝛽𝑣 𝑣𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖 (eq 4.5) 
where 𝒴𝑖 rate of suicides ,𝑔𝑖 GDP per capita, 𝑎𝑖 abortions per 1000 live births,  𝑧𝑖 alcohol 
consumption as litre per capita, 𝑝𝑖  democracy as in polity IV, 𝑢𝑖 unemployment rate,  𝑓𝑖 IMF 
loan dummy variables , 𝑠𝑖 spirit consumption as litre per capita, 𝑤𝑖 wine consumption as litre 
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Before testing the effect of the independent variables on the suicide rates in the different 
subsamples it is essential to check if there is any difference in the way these two are affected. 
In order to achieve that, we perform the Chow test. This test tests whether the coefficients in a 
regression model are the same in the various subsamples. The null hypothesis is that a1=a2 and 
b1=b2 and so on—when the H0 is accepted it indicates that the slope and intercept are the same 
in the subsamples. 
The Chow test tests whether the coefficients of two linear regressions on different data sets are 
equal. In our case we will conduct it in the two subsamples i.e. Eastern vs Western and Southern 
Vs Northern European countries. The results will then be used to determine whether the 
independent variables have different impacts in the examined subgroups and consequently to 
justify the need of dividing the data set into different subsamples.   
4.3.1.2 Panel Cointegration Models 
As an alternative to regression analysis, and a robustness check, we use panel cointegration 
analysis. The panel cointegration techniques give the opportunity to the researcher to test 
variables that have both time-series and cross-sectional dimension. This will allow us to 
account for complicated relationships between variables by testing simultaneously for 
dependencies amongst countries that exist over time. This increases the power of the test, which 
can be accounted as its main advantage compared to OLS. We run both cointegration and 
causality tests to report the short run and long run effects of the independent variables on 
suicide rates.  
Cointegration and unit root 
When non stationary variables are tested in a simple regression, the results can imply a causal 
relationship between them when no such relationship exists - spurious regression. In this case, 
we can draw interesting and useful insights by observing the way the cointegrated variables 
behave.  
The lag selection criterion to be used in the analysis is the Akaike’s information criterion (AIC) 
(Ng and Perron, 1995, Burnham and Anderson, 2002). The criterion indicates the preferred lag 
selection based on minimising the Kullback-Leibler distance between the model and the truth.  
The AIC criterion shows that the optimal number of lags to be used in our case is 8. After 




having identified the lag length we run the Johansen Maximum Likelihood(ML) with the lag 
length as indicated by AIC to examine the number of cointegrating equations in our sample. 
The results show that there are at least four thus the cointegration rank is three. Having 
confirmed its existence, we try to identify the effects of independent variables to suicide rates 
by checking the causality. 
Causality 
According to Granger (1969), causality can be divided in short-run and long-run. This means 
that the independent variables may cause an effect to the dependent in the short and not in the 
long run, vice versa or both. In the case of suicides, we will try to understand which of the 
exogenous variables affect them in the short run and which on the long run. With the use of 
vector error correction model and the Wald test we check if the above effects exist and then 
identify their nature. It should be mentioned at this stage that the error correction term 
determines the existence of long-run causality from the explanatory variables to the dependent. 
On the other hand, the test that determines the short-run causality is a Wald or F-test on the 
joint significance of the lagged explanatory variables. The null hypothesis in both cases is that 
there is no long-run effect and no short-run effect.    
4.4. OLS and Chow Test Results 
4.4.1 OLS Results 
Table 4.1 depicts the OLS results. The results show that IMF’s intervention increase the total 
suicide rate, which confirms our expectation. More specifically it seems that, on average, the 
suicides increase by 1.1 deaths per 100,000 when an IMF program is in effect, with this effect 
being significant at the 5% level of significance. In contrast, growth of GDP per capita does 
not have any effect on the suicide rate. Each additional abortion per 1000 live births leads to 
0.006 increase in suicides per 100,000 people. Put differently, 167 abortions per 1,000 live 
births can account for one additional suicide per 100,000 people. An increase in the 
unemployment rate by 1 percentage point leads to 0.21 more suicides per 100,000 people. The 
above two results are not surprising; these variables are closely linked to a person’s psychology 
and their positive effect on the dependent variable was to be expected. Unemployment and 
more specifically long-term unemployment leads to negative feelings that can distort the 
mental health of the unemployed that often leads to depression. Unemployment also means 
lower family income and at the same time a fall in social status, which strengthens the negative 
feelings, described above and could potentially lead to self-harm incidents.  
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On the other hand, democracy lowers the suicide rate: the more democratic the country the 
lower the suicide rate (a decrease of 0.19 suicides per 100,000 people for every one-point 
increase in democracy). Knowing that the dataset comprises European countries it is not very 
common to see countries in the lower bands in the Polity IV scale. The majority of the countries 
in Europe are democracies or close to being democracies. However, during the 28 years of the 
sample period there have been some countries diverging from democracy. The countries that 
were given a score less than 0 are depicted in Table 4.8.  
The last variable to discuss is the alcohol consumption per capita. The striking result is that 
alcohol consumption has a negative effect on the suicide rates. The results indicate that an 
increase in alcohol consumption by 1 litre per person decreases the suicide rate by 0.28 per 
100,000. Trying to examine if this result persists, we lagged the variable one and two years. 
When lagging once the decrease in the rate of suicides is larger; 0.41, and after applying two 
lags the effect is 0.47. The effect of the other exogenous variables is similar to the effect in the 
baseline regression. In Figure 4.4 we plot the suicide rates against alcohol consumption for the 
countries in the dataset. 





































































Considering the latter to be interesting, we have decided to further explore the alcohol effect 
on suicides by considering the breakdown of alcohol consumption into types of alcohol. 
Specifically, we rerun the regressions while substituting the alcohol consumption with wine, 
beer and spirits consumption as litres per capita (Table 4.2) for both the whole dataset and the 
subsamples.  
The results indicate that only spirits and wine lower suicides, being significant at the 1% and 
5% significance levels, respectively. On the other side, beer consumption increases suicides. 
The impact of the remaining variables is unchanged compared to what was reported earlier.  
To ensure that the results reported above are not distorted due to collinearity among the three 
different types of alcohol we run all the regressions again including only one alcohol variable 
at a time.  When including only one type of alcohol at a time, the results do not seem to 
significantly different from what was reported above, however there are some results that 
differ. Beer, as before seems to increase suicides apart from the males sample, in which there 
is no effect, whereas spirits negatively affect suicides in most of the subsamples. The 
exceptions are the females whose suicide rates are not affected by the consumption of spirits 
and the Western countries where consumption of spirits is positively correlated with suicide 
rates.  On the other hand, the results that we get when we run the regression for wines are not 
very consistent. In the whole sample, the northern countries and the males subsamples, the 
wine consumption is insignificant as a factor of suicides. When it comes to females and 
Western countries the effect of wine is negative. In contrast, in Southern and Eastern countries 
it is positive (Table 4.3). The results of the other variables are unchanged apart from the IMF 
effect on the Western countries when we run the regression with only beers: the IMF impact 
appears negative whereas before it was positive.  
From the results reported above the one that we thought it was interesting that the effect of 
spirits was positive in Western countries. To examine it further we have decided to check 
whether there is a specific country or countries that trigger this effect. We re-run the regression 
for the Western countries sample again dropping one country at a time to check if there is a 
change in the results. During the first run, we observed that when dropping Finland, the spirit 
impact on suicides becomes insignificant with the highest p-value compare to the results that 
other countries generate. However, none of the regressions give us a negative significant result 
so we repeat the same procedure one more time with all the Western countries but having as a 
starting point the sample where we do not include Finland. The observation was that in the case 
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where both Finland and Spain are not included in the sample, an increase in the spirits per 
capita decreases suicide rates in the Western countries sample.  The p-value equals 0.001 and 
the coefficient is -2.15. As far as the other variables are concerned when both countries are 
excluded unemployment increases suicides while democracy decreases them. The remaining 
three variables, abortions, GDP and IMF have no effect whatsoever. 
4.4.1.1 Chow Test Results 
In an attempt to evaluate the suicide effect in more depth we test its effect by splitting the 
sample in two ways: North vs South, and East vs West. We performed the Chow test to examine 
if any differences in the samples exist. In Table 4.10 both the Chow test results for Southern 
versus Northern and Western versus Eastern countries are represented.   
The P-value in both samples is less than 0.05 meaning that the null hypothesis is rejected. We 
can proceed with the OLS regressions for both samples.   
Southern vs Northern Europe 
In the first sample the results are similar but not identical. Suicide rates in both Southern and 
Northern countries are affected positively by abortions and unemployment. The level of 
democracy seems to have a negative effect on the Southern countries- so the more democratic 
the countries are the lower the suicide rate but democracy does not affect suicides in the 
Northern part of Europe.  On the other hand, alcohol consumption affects negatively the 
dependent variable in the Northern countries while the IMF dummy has a positive effect 
whereas both variables are insignificant in Southern Europe. Finally, suicide rates in both cases 
are not affected by GDP per capita. The results in detail are represented in Table 4.1. 
Focusing on the alcohol breakdown effect in the Northern countries we see that all three types 
of alcohol significantly affect suicides. Spirits and wine, have a negative effect while the effect 
of beer is positive. Looking into the Southern countries, we notice that wine and beer 
consumption increase suicide rates whilst spirit consumption decrease them. When comparing 
the rest of the variables nothing changes in terms of significance and the way they impact 
suicides (Table 4.2). The only exception is unemployment, which seems to change from a 
positive to negative effect. Dropping spirits from the regression it changes to positive again.  




Eastern vs Western Europe 
 
The differences in the other subsamples are substantial. The only variable remaining unchanged 
is GDP growth that does not exhibit any significance in either subsample. In Eastern European 
countries, abortions, unemployment and IMF dummy have a positive effect while alcohol 
consumption and level of democracy negative.  On the other hand, in the Western part of 
Europe, the IMF assistance and the level of democracy do not play any role in determining the 
level of suicides. Nevertheless, abortions, unemployment and alcohol consumption impact the 
dependent variables positively. The results are depicted in Table 4.1 in detail.  
In the second regressions that we run, spirits and beer positively affect suicides and wine 
negatively for Western countries whereas in Eastern Europe only spirits are found to be 
negatively significant. It should be mentioned that there is no difference in the behaviour of the 
remaining variables compared to what it was reported above (Table 4.2). 
Males Vs Females 
To continue we investigate the way the two genders behave towards suicides. Dropping the 
abortions variables from the male sample for self-explanatory reasons, we perform the OLS 
regression. Starting with the male sample, we observe that all variables but one, the GDP per 
capita, affect the dependent variable. Alcohol and level of democracy decrease the suicide rate 
whilst unemployment and IMF involvement the opposite (Table 4.1). Examining the effect of 
the specific type of alcohol we find that wine does not have any effect but spirits and beer per 
capita decrease the rates of suicides. The behaviour of the other variables is in line to what 
reported above (Table 4.2).  
The female sample generates different results. Including the abortions variable this time, we 
observe that for women, only abortions and unemployment lead them to commit suicide (Table 
4.2). The results differentiate a bit when we introduce the alcohol breakdown in the regression. 
To begin with, wine has a negative effect whereas beer a positive; spirits seem to have no effect 
whatsoever. Unemployment and abortions do not change compared to before, however the 
level of democracy now has been found negatively significant (Table 4.2). 
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 Table 4.1: OLS and sample results 
Suicide rates OLS  Southern Northern  Eastern  Western Males Females 
GDP per capita 0.01930 -0.02264 0.03225 0.01961 0.02595 -0.04574 0.00948 
      (0.0320)   (0.0402)   (0.0389)   (0.0368)   (0.0665)   (0.0490)   (0.0164)   
        
Abortions               
(per 1000live births) 
0.00640 0.00756 0.00676 0.00506 0.03299 - 0.00345 
      (0.0008)***  (0.0009)***  (0.0011)***  (0.0008)***  (0.0058)***  - (0.0004)*** 
        
Alcohol consumption (lt 
per capita) 
-0.27528 0.06447 -0.35202 -0.42889 0.42740 -0.90659 0.00918 
      (0.0919)***  (0.0962)   (0.1234)***  (0.1075)***  (0.1797)***  (0.1286)***  (0.0465)   
        
Unemployment  0.20904 0.09469 0.24738 0.25487 0.24096 0.36872 0.12075 
    (0.0450)***  (0.0436)***  (0.0628)***  (0.0651)***  (0.0631)***  (0.0688)*** (0.0230)***  
        
Democracy -0.18976 -0.27176 0.24256 -0.24373 0.60291 -0.79302 -0.08831 
(0.1126)   (0.0662)***  (0.2999)   (0.1184)***  (0.8475)   (0.1718)***  (0.05763)   
        
IMF loans 1.09393 -0.12474 1.44825 1.61148 -1.02826 3.18523 0.03165 
(0.4492)***  (0.4979)   (0.5710)***  (0.5206)***  (0.9968)   (0.6746)***  (0.2305)   
R-sq 0.2929 0.5518 0.2862 0.437 0.1573 0.2278 0.2489 
Number of obs 511 126 385 265 246 597 513 
Rho 0.901 0.9119 0.8604 0.9317 0.8533 0.9286 0.8272 
Wald chi2 202.7 127.67 152.23 189.72 40.74 164.81 154.18 
Prob>chi2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
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Table 4.2: Alcohol consumption results 
 
1. litres per capita
Suicide rates OLS  Southern Northern  Eastern  Western Males Females 
Spirits1 -0.67545 -0.73652 -0.75093 -0.91694 0.96897 -1.17772 -0.00476 
(0.1237)*** (0.3144)*** (0.1574)*** (0.1362)*** (0.3712)*** (0.2018)*** -0.0618 
Wine 1 -0.28043 0.64703 -0.66962 0.36138 -0.49769 -0.23286 -0.27555 
(0.1488) ** (0.2167)*** (0.2322)*** (0.2025) (0.24207)*** (0.2223) (0.073)*** 
Beer 1 0.84111 3.65681 0.88716 -0.19305 1.62072 -0.64604 0.67529 
(0.1701)*** (0.2618)*** (0.1960)*** (0.2454) (0.2686)*** (0.2494)*** (0.0844)*** 
Other controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R-sq 0.3652 0.2446 0.3663 0.52 0.3898 0.2168 0.3556 
Number of obs 511 126 385 265 246 597 513 
Rho 0.9152 0 0.8809 0.9476 0.6835 0.9179 0.8562 
Wald chi2 281.27 308.47 211.72 259.59 115.94 150.15 254.73 
Prob>chi2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 




Table 4.3: Separate alcohol consumption by type 
Suicide rates OLS  Southern Northern  Eastern  Western Males Females 
Spirits1 -0.74122 -0.94567 -0.71766 -0.94744 1.30229 -1.07769 -0.04954 
(0.1220)***  (0.1370)***  (0.15228)*** (0.1287)***  (0.4056)***  (0.1986)***  (0.0637)  
Other controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R-sq 0.3332 0.6859 0.3146 0.5112 0.1905 0.2049 0.2491 
    Number of obs 511 126 385 265 246 597 513 
Rho 0.9066 0.9843 0.8685 0.9401 0.6962 0.9145 0.8291 
Wald chi2 241.34 248.12 171.47 253.14 41.72 140.34 155.09 
Prob>chi2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Wine1  -0.04037 0.519277 -0.23174 0.625485 -1.19613 -0.02332 -0.21473 
(0.1543)   (0.1184)***  (0.2327431)  (0.1962)***  (0.2439)***  (0.225306)   (0.0762)***  
Other controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R-sq 0.2775 0.6172 0.271 0.4241 0.2244 0.156 0.2645 
  Number of obs 511 126 385 265 246 591 513 
Rho 0.8984 0.972 0.8576 0.9274 0.8379 0.9205 0.8324 
Wald chi2 190.36 182.1 142.46 179.97 61.35 105.92 164.94 
Prob>chi2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Beer 1 0.99411 1.32374 1.00127 0.47778 2.12723 -0.49018 0.64515 
(0.1712)*** (0.3275)*** (0.19898)*** (0.2377)*** (0.2417)*** (0.254151) (0.0838)*** 
Other controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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R-sq 0.3229 0.515 0.3217 0.4044 0.3545 0.1623 0.3309 
Number of obs 511 126 385 265 246 597 513 
Rho 0.9035 0.6713 0.8646 0.9262 0.9183 0.9238 0.8408 
Wald chi2 236.88 112.04 175.79 169.87 124.8 110.43 232.69 
Prob>chi2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 








4.4.2 Panel Cointegration 
In this section of the paper we will present the results from the panel cointegration analysis. 
Both the long and the short-term results will be discussed. 
4.4.2.1 Wald Test 
The Wald test results (Table 4.9) indicate that a long run effect exists. The p-value is less than 
0.05 thus we reject the null hypothesis that the independent variables have no effect on the 
dependent. Next, we will try to investigate a bit further by trying to understand whether each 
individual variable affects suicide rates in the short run. The results of the Wald tests (Table 
4.9) show that there is not a specific trend. The latter means that one of the variables seem to 
effect suicide rates in the short run but some do not have any effect. More specifically, 
unemployment, abortions, polity (the scale of democracy) and the IMF dummy do not suggest 
any short run effect on suicides.  
On the other hand, the other two variables, alcohol consumption and GDP per capita, exhibit a 
short-run causal effect on the dependent variable. Both their p-values are 0.03% leading to the 
rejection of the null that there is no short-run effect at the 5% level of significance. 
Observing the results, we have tried to understand the reasons behind the fact that only alcohol 
consumption and GDP growth have a short run effect on suicides. We believe that the other 
variables do not exhibit short run effects because they need time to show their effects on 
individuals. Starting with unemployment, it can be argued that it does not exhibit any short-
term effect, as it takes time for negative feelings to build up while unemployed and it is not an 
instant feeling. However, when someone is without a job for a long period of time, means that 
you are not able to provide to your family or even not being able to satisfy your basic needs. 
The above, only result in feeling depressed and maybe even “useless”.  Needless to say, also 
that peer pressure plays its role in situations like that, especially, when surrounded by people 
that all work. Everything mentioned may as well lead someone in committing suicide.  
When it comes to abortions, we think that it takes some time for a woman to realise what has 
been through and understand the feelings that an abortion has. Finally, an IMF program and 
the different conditions that are imposed to the country to hit the targets agreed do take time to 
implement. This insinuates that the citizens of a country that receives the loan will only 
understand the impact of the IMF aid only in the long run.  





The focus of this paper is the determinants of suicide rates in Europe. Literature on the topic 
exists in both sociology and economics. Our results confirm the various variables identified by 
the two disciplines indeed affect the way people behave towards suicides. More specifically, 
many papers in literature argue that an increase of both abortions and unemployment affect 
negatively suicide rates as per the results of our research. On the other side, the majority of the 
papers report that a decrease in GDP per capita and an increase in alcohol consumption 
positively affects suicides, whereas we found the former to be insignificant and the latter 
negative. 
In our paper we also examine the effects of our independent variables on suicides in various 
subsamples. We find that there are also considerable differences across countries, and between 
males and females. Focusing on European countries, we try to identify not only what factors 
can lead people to commit suicide but also their relative weight. The results are mostly as 
expected. Two of the variables, that both generate negative feelings and are associated with 
changes in the psychology of a person, abortions (measured as a number per 1000 live births) 
and unemployment, increase suicides. The IMF intervention dummy has a similar effect. On 
the other hand, the level of democracy decreases suicides, implying that the more democratic 
a country the fewer suicides it has. The GDP growth is found to be insignificant. Finally, the 
most striking result, came from the analysis is that alcohol consumption reduces the suicide 
rate. When breaking down the alcohol consumption into types of alcohol, we find that wine 
and spirits decrease the rate of suicides whilst beer increases it. A possible interpretation for 
this surprising result is that alcohol offers an alternative to suicide: depressed people drown 
their sorrows, not themselves. The fact that only stronger kinds of alcohol appear to have this 
kind of effect seems consistent with this explanation. Nevertheless, further research will be 
needed to confirm this finding.  
Moving now to the results from the different subsamples, we see that results vary depending 
on geography and sex. Firstly, we report the results obtained from two geographic divisions, 
Northern compared to Southern and Eastern compared to Western.  Three of the independent 
variables appear with the same effect on suicides in all geographic regions: abortions, 
unemployment always increase suicides and GDP growth always has no effect. The IMF 
assistance increases suicides in both Northern and Eastern Europe but is insignificant for the 
other two subsamples. The level of democracy increases suicides in Southern Europe, 




decreases them in Eastern Europe and does not affect the remaining two. In Northern and 
Eastern European countries, alcohol consumption decreases the rate of suicides. More 
specifically, spirits were found negative in both, wine negative in the Northern sample, while 
beer was positive and both wine and beer insignificant in Eastern Europe. On the other hand, 
its effect is positive in Western countries, with spirits and wine being positive and wine 
negative, and in Southern Europe. Introducing the breakdown, spirits turned out significant and 
negative but the rest insignificant. In figure 4.5 a summary of findings is presented.  




Another round of tests, focused on the alcohol effect on suicides, was to investigate what is the 
effect of each one on its own by excluding the other two types of alcohol but still including all 
the other control variables.  Starting with beer, we observe that its consumption always 
increases suicides in all the samples but one, the male sample where the effect is insignificant. 
On the other hand, spirits are insignificant in the female sample and negatively significant for 
all the others apart from the one for Western countries. When Finland and Spain are dropped 
though in the specific sample the spirit effect changes to negative, suggesting that these two 
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countries may be outliers driving the positive result in the Western sub-sample. The last type 
of alcohol that we have tested is the wine. Its results are not very consistent. In the whole 
sample, the North and the males it has no effect, in the South and East it is positive whilst in 
the West and the Females is negative. 
The last regression results to report are the gender subsamples. Excluding abortions in the 
males’ sample for obvious reasons, we find that the IMF dummy and the unemployment 
increase suicide rate whereas the level of democracy decreases it. The alcohol consumption 
impacts male suicide rates negatively, with both spirits and beer being negative and wine 
having no effect.  The GDP growth is insignificant.  Bringing back abortions to the regressions 
and re running it for females, we found that abortions and unemployment increase suicides 
whilst the other variables are insignificant. In the alcohol breakdown though, wine 
consumption was negative, beer positive and spirits had no effect. 
It is also worth noting that in an attempt to understand a bit better what affects suicides we have 
decided to check the short run and the long run effects if any with the help of a panel 
cointegration regression.  The results indicate that all the variables exhibit long run effects but 
not short run effects. More specifically, alcohol consumption and GDP per capita seem to have 
short run causal effect on suicide rates.   





Table 4.4: Descriptive statistics for countries 
Country N Mean Min Max Std. Deviation 
Czech Republic 26 14.12 10.6 18.34 2.18 
Austria 26 16.69 11.15 24.31 3.69 
Belarus 19 25.17 16.79 31.84 5.50 
Belgium 22 17.04 14.92 19.4 1.25 
Bulgaria 26 12.10 8.21 14.47 2.07 
Croatia 26 17.26 12.92 20.56 2.47 
Cyprus 9 2.23 0.13 4.4 1.48 
Dennmark 25 14.64 8.97 23.79 5.25 
Estonia 26 25.06 14.72 37.74 6.93 
Finland 26 21.63 16.23 27.48 3.61 
France 23 16.08 13.03 19.47 1.83 
Georgia 16 3.68 1.81 4.42 0.75 
Germany 26 11.63 8.64 16.79 2.09 
Greece 26 2.92 2.29 3.53 0.33 
Hungary 26 27.25 18.45 38.79 6.51 
Ireland 26 10.35 7.21 13.17 1.52 
Italy 24 5.81 4.57 6.72 0.58 
Latvia 26 25.24 16.18 37.87 6.16 
Lithuania 26 34.00 24.06 44.35 6.99 
Netherlands 26 8.51 6.93 10.11 0.74 
Norway 26 11.54 1.5 15.64 2.60 
Poland 24 13.34 11.04 15.8 1.01 
Portugal 26 6.89 3.7 9.6 1.61 
Re Republic of Moldova 24 8.32 3.7 15.92 3.90 
Romania 22 11.30 8.39 18.7 2.37 
Russia 22 30.33 21.38 39 5.62 
Serbia 12 14.11 12.59 16.05 1.05 
Slovakia 26 12.69 8.8 17.47 2.55 
Slovenia 26 23.82 15.21 30.46 4.26 
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Spain 26 6.27 5.7 6.78 0.28 
Sweden 26 12.58 10.34 16.19 2.01 
Switzerland 26 16.03 11.1 21.66 2.70 
Ukraine 22 21.39 16.48 26.43 3.30 
United Kingdom 26 6.73 5.73 7.93 0.54 
Total 810 15.17 0.13 44.35 8.52 
 
Table 4.5: Descriptive statistics 
Variables Min Max Mean  Std. Deviation 
Suicide rates per 100000 population 0.13 44.35 15.17 8.52 
GDP per capita -45.32 18.69 1.61 5.65 
Abortions per 1000live births 0.34 3152.59 492 448.28 
Alcohol consumption (lt per capita) 2.06 21.13 10.52 2.91 
Unemployment 0.6 23.9 8.8 4.34 
Democracy -8 10 8.06 4.18 
IMF loans 0 1 0.16 0.36 
 
Table 4.6: Breusch-Pagan Lagrange multiplier (LM) 
Estimated Results Variance sd = sqrt(Var) 
Suicide rates per 100000 population 67.2855 8.2028 
e 7.3273 2.7069 
u 71.4939 8.4554 
Var(u) 0 
chi2(1)    3409.7 
Prob > chi2    0 
 




Table 4.7: EU country division 
Northern  Eastern  Western Southern  
Austria Czech Republic Austria Bulgaria 
Belarus Belarus Belgium Croatia 
Belgium Bulgaria Denmark Cyprus 
Czech Republic Croatia Finland Georgia 
Denmark Cyprus France Greece 
Estonia Estonia Germany Italy 
Finland Georgia Ireland Portugal 
France Greece Netherlands Serbia 
Germany Hungary Norway Slovenia 
Hungary Italy Portugal Spain 
Ireland Latvia Spain   
Latvia Lithuania Sweden   
Lithuania Poland Switzerland   
Netherlands Republic of Moldova United Kingdom   
Norway Romania     
Poland Russia     
Republic of Moldova Serbia     
Romania Slovakia     
Russia Slovenia     
Slovakia Ukraine     
Sweden       
Switzerland       
Ukraine       
United Kingdom       
 
 
Essays of Socio Economic Ills  
 
101 
Table 4.8: Countries with low Polity IV score 
  Polity IV Score 
Country -8 -7 -6 -5 -4 -3 -2 
Czech Republic 0 4 1 0 0 0 0 
Belarus 0 17 0 0 0 0 0 
Bulgaria 0 5 0 0 0 0 0 
Croatia 0 0 0 4 0 4 0 
Hungary 0 3 0 0 0 0 1 
Poland 0 2 2 0 0 0 0 
Romania 4 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Russia 0 3 1 0 1 0 0 
Slovakia 0 4 1 0 0 0 0 
Total 4 38 5 4 1 4 2 
Table 4.9: Wald test result 
 Table 4.10: Chow test results 
Variables  Southern vs Northern Western vs Eastern 
GDP per capita 0 0 
Abortions per 1000live births 0 0 
Alcohol consumption (lt per capita) 0 0 
Unemployment 0 0 
Democracy 0 0 
IMF loans 0 0 
chi2(6)    13.89 38.85 
Prob > chi2    0.0309 0 
Variables  t-statistic F-statistic Chi-square 
Long run  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000 
GDP per capita -  0.0316  0.0267 
Abortions per 1000live births -  0.3913  0.3864 
Alcohol consumption (lt per capita) -  0.0363  0.0310 
Unemployment -  0.7169  0.7179 
Democracy -  0.3842  0.3791 
IMF loans -  0.1383  0.1301 









This thesis investigates the determinants and consequences of several socio-economic ills: 
sovereign defaults, suicides, alcohol consumption, abortions and public finance crises. All the 
above interact and can affect each other. Being more specific, there has been literature 
suggesting that alcohol consumption is related to spontaneous abortions (Kline et al (1980), 
Cavallo et al (1995), Abel (1997), Henrisken (2004)). There are also papers that investigate the 
impact of poor economics and the effect on society and find evidence to support that economic 
hardship increases the probabilities of abortion (Jones et al (2011)) and also is responsible for 
alcohol use (Conger et al (2001), Haan et al (2010), Hardaway and Cornelius (2014)) .  Finally, 
a vast literature argues that poor finances increase the probabilities of a country to declare 
default. It can be observed that the socio-economic ills are related and can affect or can be 
affected by each other. In this thesis, we attempt to provide a complete and clear image on 
sovereign defaults determinants and its affect on economics and society. We understand that 
this is a broad topic and the impacts can be various, as discussed, thus the decision was to focus 
on the economic growth of the country after experiencing a default and the role of the IMF on 
one side and on the other side, its s effect on the society by focusing on suicide rates and their 
behaviour after such an event. The figure below (5.1) depicts the link between all the chapters 














Below, the main conclusions and contribution of its chapters will be discussed, then we will 
summarise the main findings of this thesis and finally a discussion on recommendation 
regarding future research.  Starting with Chapter 2, we combine the different approaches we 
read in the literature that try to explain sovereign defaults but also introduce more variables in 
our attempt to contribute to the existing research. The novelty is the use of various political 
indices as explanatory variables and the capital controls in outflows dataset constructed by 
Fernandez (2015). These political indices are the World Government Indicators, democracy as 
measured by Polity IV, the ICRG and the Economic Freedom as defined by the Heritage 
Foundation. The main findings are that indeed political institutions play a role in whether a 
country defaults. We find that increased political stability, democracy, economic freedom 
negatively affect the probability of a country to default. On the other hand, capital controls on 
outflows, have the contrary result. We also find that when a country is in economic hardship 
thus having a high debt to GDP ratio, high fiscal deficits and increased output volatility increase 
the chances of a country to default.  
Having established that a sovereign’s institutions play a key role on a country’s probability to 
default and that indeed deteriorated macroeconomic variables increase the probability, in 
Chapter 3 we focus on one international financial institution this time instead of focusing on 




the country, the IMF, and test whether it promotes economic growth in the countries that is 
intervening in. We believe that there is a gap in the literature with respect to addressing 
endogeneity. Bearing that in mind, instead of running a simple OLS regression we run a two 
stage OLS using political and institutional instruments. These are the UNSC temporary 
membership and the level of democracy. It is worth noting as well that we lag the IMF dummy 
by up to three years in addition entering it contemporaneously. This helps account for the 
possibility that the effect of IMF bailouts is only observed with a lag. The results indicate that 
IMF assistance does help the countries to reach economic growth but not immediately. The 
positive effect of the IMF’s intervention becomes visible only with a lag of at least one year.  
The aim of Chapter 4, is to investigate how the society is affected after a crisis, both in the 
short run and the long run. The popular press has repeatedly raised the argument that the recent 
Great Recession has led to increases in suicides. We therefore explore whether such a 
relationship exists or not. Since, this is a topic that mostly falls into the field of sociology, in 
addition to the economic variables we also used sociological outcomes as explanatory 
variables. These include abortions, alcohol consumption and the level of democracy. In line 
with the literature, we conclude that there is a positive relationship between suicide rates and 
abortions and unemployment but the opposite holds for the level of democracy. IMF 
interventions increase suicides as well, but strikingly alcohol consumption decreases them. All 
the variables exhibit long run effects but not short run except for alcohol. Conducting further 
tests on geography, types of alcohol and sex we can safely report that abortions and 
unemployment always have a positive relationship with suicides, IMF either leads to an 
increase in suicides or has no effect. Finally, spirits decrease suicides whilst wine and beer 
provide mixed results.  
We believe that one of the main conclusion of this thesis is the evidence that an interrelation 
between political and economic variables exist and their combination increases the explanatory 
power of the model and the results robustness. In Chapter 2 we establish that institutions affect 
the probability of sovereign default and in Chapter 3 we provide evidence that institutions 
determine whether the IMF will get involved when countries face public-finance and broader 
economic crises. The results presented in this thesis also stress the importance of identifying 
the right regression specification in terms of sample composition, time or model. In Chapter 3, 
we argue that endogeneity and contemporaneity distort the results and consequently the use of 
instruments and lags is crucial. In this Chapter 4, dividing the sample into various sub samples 
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demonstrates that sometimes very different results can be obtained depending on which 
countries are included in the analysis.  
We can also generally report that the level of democracy plays a significant role in all the topics 
examined in this thesis. The more democratic the country the smaller the probability to default 
or receive an IMF loan and the smaller the suicide rate. Furthermore, we can argue that IMF 
intervention does indeed have an impact on both the society and the economy; it boosts 
economic growth with a lag a year but unfortunately increases suicides. The latter effect, 
importantly, appears even when we control for economic growth and unemployment, so that it 
cannot be attributed to the worsening of economic performance associated with the economic 
hardship that led the country to request IMF assistance. One possible way to approach and 
explain this result is to focus on the measures that the fund implements in the countries that 
intervenes. These are mostly austerity measures, targeting in taxes and government spending, 
increases in the first case and decreases in the second. In many countries these except for 
resulting in social unrest, unfortunately also negatively affect the people’s psychology leading 
to increased probabilities to suicide.  Lastly, a general observation would be that when 
analysing socio-economic ills, the results can be unexpected and counter intuitive such as the 
effect of alcohol consumption on suicides. 
The thesis covers a lot of ground but there some limitations. We believe that future research 
could introduce more variables in the models. Starting with the Chapter 2, since evidence 
shows that political institutions determine defaults, it would be interesting to examine whether 
politics also affect in any way the country’s decision to repay the debt. Some of the explanatory 
variables that can be included are the orientation of the government in power just before and 
while the default occurs. By orientation, we mean whether it is a left or a right- wing 
government in power; the database of http://www.cpds-data.org/can be used. The timing to 
elections will also be a metric that can be used as it can be argued that governments that have 
only a year left before the elections would probably try to avoid the default to stand a chance 
to win the upcoming elections.  
The orientation of the government in power can also be used as an instrument in Chapter 3 
along with the UNSC temporary membership and level of democracy. This is because the 
probability of resorting to IMF is different depending on orientation of government but this 
does not affect the economic growth of the country. To elaborate a bit more, a left-wing 
government is not expected to resort easily to IMF for help as it is contract with the ideas and 




ideology that stands for. Also, the use of individual- level of implications of IMF bailouts will 
enhance the research.  
Finally, in Chapter 5 to understand a bit better how suicide rates behave in difficult economic 
periods, it would be interesting to investigate how and if changes in income affect suicides in 
the whole sample and by sex and differences in the general economic state of a country. One 
would expect that females for example, in an advanced economy where they earn similar to 
their male counterparts and contribute the family, would react differently to a cut in their 
income compared to females in emerging economies where probably have not reached that 
stage of “income” equality yet. Lastly, in the analysis of suicide determinants rather than using 
in the analysis aggregate level data, individual could be used to enhance the results and provide 
a better understanding.  
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